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1. Introduction 
The thesis deals with the issue of using performance measurement in public 
sector financing, and within that deals with the difficulties of measuring the 
performance of Hungarian Defense Forces. The choice of topic is all the more 
current, because there has been an emergence in Hungarian public thinking of the 
need for using performance assessment in public administration, so much so, that the 
accountability on performance has been lifted into law. 
Hungarian regulation however cannot be called thorough and satisfactory, 
since although principles and expectations are in harmony with international practice, 
but the basic conditions of implementation, and the possible ways of establishing 
these conditions did not fall within the scope of any study.  
The objective of the thesis – acting as a gap filler – is that in the case of one of 
the important players of the Hungarian public administration, i.e. the Hungarian 
Defense Forces, to study the possibilities of implementing the system of performance 
measurement within the current frameworks. At the same time, it aims to identify 
those regulatory areas that are currently the obstacles to operating a system, which is 
capable of measuring efficiency and effectiveness. 
The study reviews the practice of performance measurement in the case of 
different foreign Armed Forces, but does not have an objective to provide any 
suggestions for the establishment of a Hungarian system of performance 
measurement in defense, it only aims to identify the rules and regulations, which 
currently are obstacles to the establishment of such a system.  
The precondition for introducing performance management, controlling and for 
the integration of data on financial and professional performance, is a well-
established and well functioning accounting information system.  
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The study has a separate chapter, in which it looks through Hungarian and 
international accounting terminology. The chapter also clarifies the conceptional 
discrepancies in Hungarian literature concerning the two sub areas of accounting, 
financial and management accounting, and at the same time compares the objectives 
and tools used by these two sub areas.  
The third chapter of the study deals with controlling. There have been 
numerous publications appearing in Hungary in this topic that are based on 
international literature, so the thesis only touches upon this area to the extent 
required by the purpose of the study and will not go into further detail.  
Chapter 4 deals in general with the differences between the budgetary and 
market organizations, which – as the changing approach over the last decades in 
respect of the public sector, and the fact that certain state services are provided by 
market organizations show – have been occasionally overemphasized.  
It is however important to highlight, that state owned organizations tend to start 
from a less favorable competitive situation, since their management falls within the 
scope of numerous regulations, which determine quite significantly the allocation of 
resources, and do not allow rapid and flexible reaction.  
The chapter also looks through the history of accounting in the Hungarian 
public sector, and compares the accruals and cash based accounting systems, 
introduces the international trends of transition to accruals accounting. Quite 
naturally, implementing accruals accounting, although it provides more information 
for the assessment of performance, also carries a higher cost. Thus, changing the 
accounting system cannot be the initial step of the reform of the public sector, it first 
has to be clarified what objectives the accounting system has to serve, and it is only 
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than, that decisions can be made whether accruals accounting is necessary to realize 
these objectives. 
Chapter five deals with the international experiences of public sector reforms 
and studies the objectives of the reform, the organizational changes aimed at 
fulfilling requirements of financial and performance management, and studies the 
performance information system. Following a comparative analysis, the experience 
of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are introduced in more 
detail, with a special emphasis on results achieved in defense sector.  
Chapter 6 discusses the concept of performance measurement, reviews 
requirements vis-à-vis performance measurement, and also articulates benefits 
expected from the system. It introduces international models established for 
performance measurement and the international practice of performance based 
budgeting and management. This line of thought is concluded by the comparison 
between performance audit aimed at justifying performance measurement 
information and traditional auditing.  
Chapter 7 introduces a tool, the balanced scorecard system, which is suitable 
for the integration of professional and financial performance, and facilitates the 
development of the organization in the future. Following a short summary of 
Hungarian experiences of implementing the Balanced Scorecard in market 
organizations, the thesis goes on to introduce the solution developed by the UK 
Ministry of Defense, which now is looked upon as the framework for defense 
performance management in the UK.    
Chapter 8 discusses the impacts of the international reform trends in public 
sector, which places in the forefront performance management, in Hungary. Besides 
ordering the establishment of indicators to measure efficiency, and the fact that 
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methodology is still under development, Hungarian regulations primarily approached 
performance measurement through outcome, and mandatorily prescribe the 
measurement of consumer satisfaction to study effectiveness. 
Chapter 9 shortly introduces the management system of the Hungarian Defense 
Forces, with a special emphasis on the characteristics of central and institutional 
management and the accounting system.  
The novelty of this thesis is that research assumptions, first in Hungarian 
literature, primarily study the basic conditions of the implementation of reform and 
two hypotheses are used to prove that within the current framework there is no 
possibility for the measurement of efficiency. It concludes that there are changes 
required at government and portfolio level in order to establish those basic 
conditions.  
The third hypothesis proves, that the tool of public surveys in order to measure 
effectiveness cannot be used to measure performance in the defense sector. It can be 
a good method in the case of certain public services, but I use the third hypothesis to 
prove that in the case of defense, such surveys will tend to show the success of the 
media strategy rather than the performance of the organization itself.  
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2. Accounting 
2.1. Accounting 
A given system can be characterized at two levels: on the one hand with the 
flow of material assets, which could be looked upon as reality, and also with the 
projection of reality, i.e. with the flow of information about these movements. The 
objective of the flow of information is to be able to control real processes (Anthony, 
1988.).  However, when establishing an information system, we have to take into 
account, that information is a resource, which has explicit and implicit costs.  
The method aimed at projecting reality is accounting, the history of which goes 
back a long time. Numerous authors stated, that it was the Italian Paccioli in 1494 
that developed double entry bookkeeping, while several researchers emphasized, that 
Paccioli only published what had already been functioning well in practice (Ashton 
at al, 1991.). Certain authors say, that even the industrial revolution 200 years ago 
would not have taken place this way without accounting. It was the accounting that 
provided the most basic financial information about economic activities; this was the 
language of business, which was indispensable to support technological development 
(Herbert at al, 1987.).  
 In the recent periods besides accounting, the use of the terms financial and 
management accounting has also become popular in Hungary. The use, however, of 
these terms is many times misleading and confused. Many authors try to blame 
accounting for the fact, that information provided by the accounting system was not 
used appropriately, and that in many cases internal accounting systems were built 
with deficiencies.  
Wimmer talks about the change in the organizational role of accounting, saying 
that “in contrast to external reports, information to support management has gained 
importance” (Wimmer, 2000.), which we could also phrase another way, that they 
had realized the inherent potential of accounting, and are trying to put that to the 
service of management. 
Budai depict the relationship between management decisions and the data 
hierarchy in accounting according to Figure 1.  
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Decision makers Type of decision Levels of accounting data 
Owners and higher 
management 
Strategic decisions Balance sheet  
Middle management Tactical and regulatory 
decisions 
General Ledger 
Operative control Operative decisions Analytics 
Employees Implementation 
(Transactions) 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between accounting data hierarchy and management decisions.  
Source: Budai, 2002. 
According to the categories defined by international literature, the Hungarian 
term of accounting covers two distinct areas: financial accounting and management 
accounting. Financial accounting serves to provide information to all the external 
stakeholders (state, investors, competitors, etc.) of a given economic entity. It 
provides a reliable and realistic picture of the situation of the assets, the finances and 
the income of the given organization, according to such a transparent and integrated 
form, which allows comparison with other market actors (Adorján at al, 2002.).   
Management accounting serves to provide information to internal users, and 
provides the information basis for decision-making. It depends on management 
decisions what sort of calculations and reports should be prepared, which are the 
main dimensions about which information needs to be gained.  
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The notion of accounting in Hungary covers both areas (Baricz, 1999.), and 
beyond the accounting activity serving to justify the annual report, it also comprises 
different methods of unit cost calculation, break-even calculation, etc.  
Management accounting information is primarily used within the 
organizations, and access by third parties to this information can be in certain cases 
detrimental even to the competitive position of the company. It is for this reason, that 
there is no need to have a standardized system for management accounting; every 
organization can develop the substance, the format, and the frequency of data 
provision according to its own needs (Tóth, 1999.). 
Boda and Szlávik have suggested the term “external accounting” and “internal 
accounting” for the international terms of financial accounting and management 
accounting, because management accounting is just as much financial as financial 
accounting itself is (Boda-Szlávik, 2001.).  
Stolowy and Touron, however, deny this approach. They say, that many 
characterize financial accounting as being externally oriented, although it has many 
internal users, not to mention the managers, who should be the first to be interested 
in knowing the financial situation and the profit of the organizations. However, they 
think that management accounting analyzes only certain activities, certain 
organizational units and certain products, hence does not provide comprehensive 
information about the totality of the performance of the organization, thus it 
primarily serves internal needs (Stolowy-Touron, 1997.). 
In my opinion, the majority of the misunderstandings in Hungarian literature is 
rooted in the fact that standardized accounting regulation only pertained to the field 
of financial accounting. As stated earlier, with this we establish the possibility to 
compare the performance of the actors in the economy. Reports on the operations of 
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different organizations are prepared according to identical principles, processes and 
rules, and comply with identical requirements on substance.  
In the absence of standardized regulation for management accounting, this area 
was many times neglected, steps were not taken to establish an internal flow of data 
to support management, and this was always blamed on accounting.  
There is another frequent mistake in Hungarian literature, rooted in the misuse 
of terminology; accounting is many times criticized because of its past orientation. 
According to Grimshaw the emphasis for example shifted to the fact that 
management needs to have information, which makes it possible to plan for the 
future, and management needs to step beyond the registration of past results. He calls 
this function of accounting “management accounting”, a term that covers all those 
accounting methods, systems and techniques, which coupled with specialist 
knowledge and skills can help management maximalize profit and minimalize losses 
(Grimshaw, 1993.).  
This supposed deficiency, as we see, is mainly caused by the fact, that 
accounting itself was interpreted as purely financial accounting. The main objective 
of financial accounting cannot be anything else, but the preparation of a reliable 
report covering a recent period, mostly a year (Reke-Berényiné, 2001.). If in this 
report we do not rely on data stemming from events of the past, than we disregard 
many basic principles of accounting, so reliability and comparability of the reports is 
going to be severely questioned.  
Management accounting, however, can have any type of orientation according 
to management needs. The point of depart is the data of the past to provide a reliable 
basis, since it is easier to forecast future situations with a larger probability, if we 
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study trends in the past. If we disassociate ourselves from the facts, our system is 
going to be unreliable guesswork, which should never be called accounting. 
 
2.2. Management accounting 
 
Looking at its history, management accounting derives from cost calculation 
techniques developed at the end of the 19th century in England. Cost calculation 
techniques became important from the second half of the 19th century, because as a 
result of technical development, the scope of local business widened, thus the 
organization grew as well as the indirect costs, so the unit cost of a product was not 
so evident anymore.  
Management accounting research flourished from the end of the 1950s until the 
mid 1970s in America. By the 1980s, the gap between the theoretical basis for 
management accounting and the methods used in practice grew rather large. It was 
Johnson and Kaplan who articulated perhaps the widest known criticisms in their 
book titled “Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting” 
(Johnson-Kaplan, 1991.). According to their opinion, management accounting 
system was not adequate for the modern requirements of competition (Ashton at al, 
1991.).  
Chadwick characterizes management accounting according to the following:  
1. The flow of information provided by management accounting allows 
managers to react at the earliest to any emerging problems or situations. 
Consultations are required with the users of information, the managers, in order to 
ascertain their need for information and the timing of information required etc. 
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2. It provides advice to managers to explain the economic consequences 
of their decisions and alternative actions, as well as to discuss information related to 
implementation.  
3. Based on organizational objectives and forecasts for the future, it also 
helps to plan expected performance and to compare that with actual figures.  
4. For the success of a management accounting system, it is 
indispensable to have a reliable and efficient communication system. Clear 
communication and understandable formats are required (reports, analysis, tables, 
diagrams, graphs), but at the same time information should not overburden 
managers.  
5. The system has to be flexible enough in order to react rapidly to 
organizational or environmental changes. 
6. It is essential to be aware of the role that other business functions play, 
cooperation and coordination is also necessary with these functions, especially when 
preparing a budget.   
7. Users of the information have to be knowledgeable about methods 
used, have to know the benefits and the restraints of these methods, thus great 
emphasis has to be placed on the training of the staff.  
8. Management accounting is not an exact science; the majority of 
information generated is subjective. Management accounting is not of primary 
importance in decision-making; it is only one of those tools serving the needs of the 
management, which helps more justified decisions (Chadwick, 1999.)   
    Herbert and his co-authors emphasize that a system to be established has to 
be able to also collect and use statistical data, performance and efficiency indicators 
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beside cost figures. They define the areas of management accounting according to 
the following:  
1. Cost estimation: aiming at planning and controlling.  
2. Planning: e.g. to show whether there is a need for a new product, a 
new service or a new installation.   
3. Cost control: to monitor costs whether they are acceptable in the case 
of a given activity.  
4. Performance management: for management assessment to see how 
efficiently the organization was managed.  
5. Motivation of management: to provide for the integrity of objectives. 
Standards, budget and performance measurement methods have to be established in 
such way so that they are suitable for motivation (Herbert at al, 1987.). 
According to the definition of Bartók Nagy management accounting is such a 
system of organization, planning, accounting, evaluation and information provision 
which has the objective of providing the necessary data and information (for decision 
making, planning, monitoring, assessment) to the organizational units that helps to 
maximalize outputs and outcomes.  
The main objective of management accounting is to provide unit cost 
calculation, to provide information assisting decision making – for which the main 
requirement is continuity, precision, applicability, clarity and timeliness – support 
planning and controlling (Bartók Nagy, 1997.). Management accounting however 
can also serve to support strategic decisions for which precision is less important 
(Cooper, 1993.). 
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2.3. The comparison of management and financial accounting 
 
Herbert and his co-authors had the opinion that management accounting as 
opposed to financial accounting:  
- places a greater emphasis on information required for planning, programming 
and decision making;  
- beside adherence to regulation and advancing financial accountability it 
supports management control by developing cost standards and preparing reports on 
any deviation from those standards; 
- provides internal management reports on activities to the different levels of 
management; 
- where possible, it supports the cost consciousness of managers; 
- is better tied to decision making and setting performance, than to fiscal 
control (Herbert at al, 1987.).  
The differences between financial and management accounting are set forth in 
Table 1. according to Bartók Nagy:  
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Financial Accounting Management Accounting 
The principles and substance of financial 
accounting are determined by law. 
The principles and substance of 
management accounting is to be 
developed by the entrepreneur. 
The principles and substance of financial 
report is regulated by law.  
There are no legislative regulations either 
on the obligation to prepare the report or  
on its substance. 
The financial report concentrates on the 
whole of the enterprise, and its 
information is primarily in value.  
Management accounting concentrates on 
the units of the enterprise and on their 
products. It utilizes indicators of quantity, 
as well as information on value.  
In financial accounting, the data on the 
past is decisive.  
In management accounting besides data 
of the past planning also uses future data 
and information.  
Table 1: The comparison of financial and management accounting.  
Source: Bartók Nagy, 1997. p. 10. 
 
 
 Boda and Szlávik have prepared a more detailed comparative table (see Table 
2) to show the differences between financial and management accounting.  
Areas of 
comparison 
External Accounting 
Requirements  
Management Accounting 
Requirements 
Users Individuals and 
organizations outside the 
business unit:  
- state, 
- owners, 
- shareholders, 
- business partners, 
- debtors, investors. 
Management 
Substance According to the Accounting 
Act  
In accordance with the 
Accounting Act, but according 
to the rules of business 
processes  
Format According to the Accounting 
Act  
To best demonstrate business 
processes.  
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Accounting 
methodology 
Double entry bookkeeping Is not restricted to double entry 
bookkeeping. Any other 
system consistent with that can 
be used.  
Criteria Should be objective, 
controllable and consistent 
Should be relevant, useful and 
comprehensible 
Reality  Actual  Forecast, plan 
Studied period Usually 1 year As required by efficient 
management  
Time period Past Present, future 
Frequency  Annually Monthly 
Delay 1-4 month Maximum 1 week 
Organizational 
focus 
The whole of the company Broken down to organizational 
units  
Activity focus The complete activity of the 
company 
Broken down to activities and 
products 
Unit of 
measurement 
Nominal value Any other value (e.g. fixed 
price) or any other useful 
volume units: price, working 
hours, machine hours etc. 
Data type Balance sheet 
Profit and Loss Statement 
Cash-flow Statement  
Notes to the financial report 
  
 
Balance sheet 
Profit and Loss Statement 
Cash-flow Statement  
Information on the 
environment 
Market information 
Sales information 
Production information 
Stock data 
Procurement information 
Investment information 
Human resource information 
etc. 
Structure of profit 
and loss statement 
According to the Accounting 
Act 
To show the profit by activities
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Main emphases To provide the most precise 
picture about the impacts of 
transactions on the assets 
and incomes  
Timeliness 
Focus points The general economic 
situation of the enterprise  
Cost management 
Table 2: The comparison of external and management accounting requirements. 
Source: Boda-Szlávik, 2001. pp. 93-94. 
 
When analyzing the table above, we can see that the differences are 
exaggerated in several areas, because the two columns of the table show two 
approaches to the same thing, and not two fundamentally different systems. One of 
these exaggerated differentiations is frequency, since financial reports in financial 
accounting can be generated not only once a year. The practice of leading companies 
shows, that in fact financial accounting information is generated more frequently 
than this, and in the case of budgetary organizations the regulations themselves 
require a greater frequency.  
The borders between the two areas are also disappearing when it comes to the 
break down of activities, since data referring to the overall activity of a company is 
always generated as a sum of the data of activities in the different areas. Thus, we 
can say that the performance of the company overall is the sum of the performance of 
the individual organizational units.  
According to the comparison of Garrison, management accounting is different 
from financial accounting, since: 
- it primarily provides information for internal use by management; 
- it places a greater emphasis on the future; 
- it highlights the relevance and flexibility of the data; 
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- it places a smaller emphasis on precision and places a greater emphasis on 
non-financial data; 
- it highlights organizational segments and does not look at the company as a 
whole; 
- it relies significantly on other sciences; 
- it does not need to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles; 
- it is not mandatory (Garrison, 1991.). 
According to the opinion of Czink, financial and management accounting are 
separated in developed market economies, while in our country this separation has 
not taken place yet (Czink, 2002). The comparison of Anglo-Saxon and German type 
accounting systems, however denies this remark, and it can be seen, that it is not an 
indicator of development, whether the two systems are separated or not, but is rather 
defined through the tradition of accounting. 
Erős points to the fact, that registering the costs by activities was basically 
mandatory before the Accounting Act came into force in 1991. It emphasizes that the 
introduction of the new Act forced management to only keep this otherwise costly 
system of accounting in place, if the size of the company and the variety of activities 
requires that (Erős, 1993.).   
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3. Controlling 
3.1. The emergence of controlling in Hungary 
 
Controlling as a management tool developed from the treasury function of 
public finances, the person supervising the financing was called the controller. The 
Controllers’ Institute of America was established in 1931 in the US, they published 
an official journal titled The Controller (Körmendi-Tóth, 2002.). Controlling started 
developing in Europe from the 50s and 60s, whereas research has been conducted in 
Hungary since the 1990s1 (Bordáné, 1993.).  
It can be said on the basis of Hungarian experiences, that controlling solutions 
were primarily introduced by organizations in the market sphere, and publications 
also referred to this area (Csikós at al 1993; Francsovics 1995; Horváth 1995; 
Kapitány 1991; Körmendi-Tóth 2002; Salamon 1993; Somogyi 1994.). 
   Bodnár provides a comprehensive description to interpret controlling 
(management function, tool set supporting management, regulation, information 
system) (Bodnár, 1997a and 1999.). There are numerous sources in literature which 
discuss not only controlling, but accounting as the basis of controlling (Bodnár, 
1997b, Bordáné 1991; Bordáné 1993; Ladó 1990; Ladó 1992; Sinkovics, 2002; 
Soosné 1995; Sutus 1999.), whereas other authors also provide a manual for the 
introduction of controlling (Mann-Mayer, 1993.). 
    In the early years, there was quite a lot of criticism directed towards 
company managers, that by misinterpreting the approach of controlling, they do not 
establish a suitable system. What they did was just rename departments responsible 
earlier for internal audit, while leaving their previous tasks the same, and thus only 
 
1 In the Hungarian literature in the early years numerous contested translations appeared.  Ladó e.g. 
translated controlling as profit management (Ladó 1990.), Bordáné translated management control 
systems as management supervision systems (Bordáné, 1991.) etc.   
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increased the workload by requiring new reports, but did not benefit from the 
potential offered by controlling.  
Analyzing Hungarian corporate practice Bodnár states, that controlling mainly 
concentrates on financial data, primarily serves to support higher management, is 
rarely used to motivate lower levels, or to help decentralized decision-making 
(Bodnár, 1997c, 1999.).   
Jenei, while separating controlling and internal audit function, at the same time 
emphasizes the importance of co-operation between these two areas. Per definition, 
internal audit compares actions, facts, and situations with requirements, guidelines, 
regulations, and sets forth proposal for management after analyzing the difference 
between the afore mentioned. According to his interpretation, controlling can also be 
defined in the same way, but here it is not regulation to which we compare, but the 
plan (Jenei, 1995.)  
Controlling is one of the subsystems of management, the objective of which is 
to compare data of planning and implementation, and in analyzing this, to provide 
information to decision makers on the status of the organization, and if the 
organization is not heading into the required direction, then to provide a possibility 
for timely intervention.   
 Horváth and Mészáros highlight that controlling does not impact the 
responsibility of mangers for result, controlling only provides the transparency, 
necessary for justified decisions, and provides information, decision support and 
coordination services (Horváth-Mészáros, 1997.) 
According to the definition of Bartók Nagy, controlling is an integrated system 
of management techniques, mainly based on accounting, which allows people 
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working in the organization to meet the goals set forth in strategy (Bartók Nagy, 
1997.). 
3.2. Types of controlling 
 
One of the most well known classifications of controlling was made by 
William Ouchi, who differentiated between bureaucratic, market and clan control. 
Bureaucratic control studies adherence to rules, while market control sets forth 
standards, mainly articulated in financial terms, for the process or the output. Both 
for market and for bureaucratic control it is a precondition that the performance of 
employees or organizational units be measurable either by output or by evaluating 
the processes (quoted by Bodnár-Dobák-Császár, 1996.). 
In terms of its timeframe, there are three different types of controlling: task 
control, management control and strategic control. A well functioning controlling 
system can only be construed by covering all three different types of controlling, but 
all three requiring different approach and different tool sets (Horváth, 1995.). 
Robert Newton Anthony said, that management control is a process, through 
which managers influence other members of the organization in order to implement 
the organizational strategy (Anthony, 1988.).   
Strategic planning aims to establish the long term goals of an organization, and 
the strategy required to achieve these goals is also decided on. It provides general 
guidelines as to what kind of activities are deemed necessary for the achievement of 
these objectives.  
One of the main differences between management control and strategic control 
is regularity (Anthony, 1988.). Strategic plans are not modified at a predefined time, 
but are modified in situations when a given market or a sector shows substantial 
changes in the basic conditions. There is also further difference in management 
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levels, since top managers decide on strategic plans, while management control has 
an impact on every level of management.  
Task control aims at providing for the efficiency of the implementation of 
elementary tasks. In comparison to management control, it has a shorter scope of 
time and it is carried out at a lower level of management.  
If we look at another way of classification of controlling activities, we can also 
talk about operative controlling and project controlling. The main activities in both 
cases are programming, budgeting, implementation, assessment; the methods used 
however are different (Horváth, 1995.). 
3.3. The controlling function 
 
Controlling cannot be construed as being an incentive for strict realization of 
the plans, since these plans were approved by managers, on the basis of assumptions 
valid at the time of approval, and if the assumptions underlying the plan change, or if 
events happening differ from those set forth in the assumptions, then the plan itself 
has to change also. The organization’s objective is not to implement a plan, but is to 
achieve its strategic goals.  
In order to steer the organization towards its objectives by comparing plans and 
actual figures, it is necessary to ascertain the difference between actual costs and 
planned costs; to analyze deviation; to discuss deviations with the responsible 
people; to define the reasons for the deviation and to make corrective measures 
(aimed at adjusting the plans or improving the efficiency) (Csikós at al, 1993.).       
When studying the difference and defining the reasons, it is crucially important 
not to fall into the trap of using the so-called “sergeant” approach (Hurton, 2002.). 
This means that the objective is not to reprimand staff, because then the employees 
will become interested in covering up the real reasons for the difference. Instead of 
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looking for the culprit, controlling should be forward looking, and should draw the 
lessons important for the organization itself (Salamon, 1993.). 
Occasionally, the reason for the difference is the unrealistic plan, thus its 
original objectives related to a program or a project need to be revised. Sometimes 
the reason is the lack of effort or a misunderstanding, because of the poorly 
communicated expectation. Factors that managers cannot influence sometimes also 
cause such differences. There is a need for intervention in these cases, but first it has 
to be studied whether the proposed action will actually correct the situation (Herbert 
at al, 1987.).        
Controlling also has the task of defining the organizational objectives, 
collecting and processing information required for decision-making and for 
economic planning, comparing actual and planned data, uncovering the reasons for 
differences between the two and defining areas for intervention, while also providing 
the necessary information for management (Bodnár, 2001.).  
According to Anthony and Govidnarajan during the course of management 
control activity, we have to plan what to do, have to send the information to the 
relevant users, and we have to be able to assess implementation, decide on necessary 
intervention and to influence people to change their behavior (Anthony-
Govidnarajan, 1998.). 
The early definitions of control placed the emphasis on reactive intervention, 
however nowadays it is continuous monitoring that is considered important, and the 
establishment of a system, which will already signal problems before they arise. 
According to the definition of Mockler this is a regular activity, during the course of 
which performance standards are established in accordance with the planning 
objectives, information feedback is provided for, actual activity is compared with 
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standards to see if there is any difference, the significance of this difference is 
measured and necessary measures are taken to have a more efficient and more 
effective use of resources in order to achieve organizational objectives (Mockler, 
1989.). 
The establishment of a controlling system has to start with the definition of the 
information requirement: the content, structure, scope, regularity (regular or 
occasional), form (verbal or written), analytic methods and documentation of reports 
has to be defined (Anthony-Young, 1988.).  
Salamon classifies information according to three dimensions into eight 
categories: qualitative or quantitative, external or internal, regular or ad hoc. He 
points to the fact that information systems fundamentally aimed at handling regular, 
internal and quantitative information (Salamon, 1993.). 
When talking about the requirements on information, Grimshaw says that 
information needs to be useful, needs to provide assistance to the management, needs 
to be precise and comprehensive, needs to be timely and adequately detailed. He also 
highlights that the provider of information should always get a feedback from the 
management (Grimshaw, 1993.). 
When introducing controlling in defense sector, the laws of controlling 
bureaucratic organizations should be taken into account, because of the size of the 
organization and its complexity:  
1. The law of imperfect control says that large organizations cannot be 
controlled perfectly, thus, we are in a contradiction with the formal requirements of 
bureaucratic organizations. 
2.  The law of decreasing control says, that the larger the organization, 
the weaker the control of top management over the employees.  
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3. The law of decreasing coordination says, that coordination between 
the different activities decreases with the increase of the size of the organization 
(Vígvári quoting Gulyás, 2002.).  
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4. Characteristics of management in the public sector 
4.1. The budget  
 
The operation of public sector organizations is based on a budget, which 
provides the legal basis for the use of financial assets and accountability. The budget 
is a financial articulation of the activities of the given public sector organization 
which identifies expected revenues, provides the mandate for the execution of tasks 
and allocates expenses to them.  
In order to establish transparent budget, the International Monetary Fund 
considers it important to have roles and responsibilities clearly defined, information 
publicly accessible, to have an open budgetary planning and implementation process, 
as well as a reporting system, and to have, as an independent safeguard, external 
audit (Csonka-Lehman, 2000.). 
Other actors of the market sector can also prepare budgets, but in the case of 
budgetary organizations, this also constitutes a spending limit for the given 
organization, and different members of the executive or interest groups can influence 
the budget.  
The category of profit has a special interpretation in the case of budgetary 
organizations. The balance of the budget requires that revenues and expenditures be 
always identical. If revenues are larger, than it means that taxpayers’ money was 
collected unnecessarily, or some state services were not provided in the way planned.  
The preparation of the budget also serves as an incentive for the managers to 
develop plans, provides information to them about the expectations and contributes 
to establishing the commitment of the leadership, coordinates the different activities 
of the organization, and provides a norm for the assessment of actual activities 
(Anthony, 1989.).  
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Budgetary organizations are thus different from market actors in that they 
operate within predefined limits, there is a given spending limit, the budget 
appropriation. Market organizations can influence their available resources through 
their production activity, whereas in the case of budgetary organizations the amount 
and the allocation of resources are dependent on a political consensus reflecting 
socio-political objectives.  
The quality of management should not, however, be influenced by the non-
profit character of the activity. It is observable that the lines between the two sectors 
are becoming less and less evident with the closer cooperation between the public 
and the private sector (Kovács, 2003b).  
The budgetary sector also provides services, however the beneficiaries of these 
services do not have an individual decision whether they need the service or which 
level of service they need, and do not pay the service provider directly for the service 
rendered to them (Pete, 1997.).  
Although, per definition the budget deals with the future, annual budget tends 
to disregard the more distant future. Realizing this, many countries have established 
a long term and a medium term planning framework as the basis for their annual 
budgetary cycle.  
The process of budgeting is a cyclical decision making process. There is a need 
to analyze systematically resources allocated earlier, and their impact on objectives 
to be achieved, and at the same time to study what future commitments should be 
made in order to achieve the objectives of the organization. An appropriately 
established budgetary process can greatly contribute to better efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability (Herbert at al, 1987.).  
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The allocation of resources in public sector financing is made all the more 
difficult by the fact, that many look upon the budget as freely available money that 
anyone can tap into, and government cycles stand in the way of strategic 
management, while as a result of the asymmetric information, we can observe the 
emergence of the principal-agent problem.   
Nyikos finds it necessary to rethink the tasks and subsystems of the public 
sector, and to institute a reform of the information, planning and decision-making 
system. He has the opinion that law should also set forth, what the executive branch 
of power has to report on at the end of budget cycle, and the functional classification 
system needs to be developed further accordingly (Nyikos, 2002.).  
4.2. The Hungarian regulation of budgetary management2  
 
Budgetary organizations work according to an annual budget, and prepare their 
annual report, which has to be in relation with their tasks. One of the most 
emphasized and politically scrutinized areas of budgetary management is planning. 
Tasks, related to planning the budget can be divided into planning professional tasks 
and calculation. Professional tasks related to budgetary planning comprise: 
- specifying planning requirements, guidelines and methodology and enforce 
them; 
-  specifying professional tasks in line with budget estimations and professional 
requirements; 
- specifying the personal, material, organizational requirements of professional 
tasks. 
 
2 Based on the Act on Public Finances (Act XXXVIII. of 1992) and on the Government Decree on 
Budgetary Management (217/1998. (XII. 30.)). 
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 The calculation extends to:  
- establishment of budgetary revenue and expenditure estimations; 
- establishment of a financing plan for the budget; 
- the specification of the number of personnel; 
- the development of indicators related to tasks (task indicators) and budgetary 
indicators related to financing the tasks (normative contribution); 
The supervising organization will: 
- define the general planning requirements, methodology and guidelines that 
are to be used compulsorily;  
- provide information on estimation of expenditure, revenue and number of 
personnel available for the subordinate organization; 
- define the changes in the implementation of tasks in order to increase 
economy;  
- decide on the reallocation of tasks and funds between subordinate budgetary 
organizations; 
- study the available organizational, material and human resources for the 
implementation of professional concepts, while also decide on possible increase or 
decrease of such resources; 
- on the basis of professional priorities plan the allocation of expected surplus 
revenues that are the result of improvement in efficiency and economy. 
I am on the opinion that from the list above the two areas most fit for change 
are the central management of revenues, expenditures and number of personnel, and 
the central decisions on necessary steps to improve efficiency and economy. Instead 
of the top-down planning of the budget, it would be better to define tasks top-down 
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and then calculate the required expenditure and the required number of personnel for 
the given set of tasks at the organizational level.  
Measures to increase economy again are quite difficult to define centrally, 
especially in the case of the Hungarian military, which is a 40,000 persons strong 
organization. The management of an organization – given certain incentives – would 
most probably be in a better position to articulate proposals to increase economy and 
efficiency. This, of course, would not mean that certain solutions used by an 
organization successfully could not be a benchmark for the others. 
The budget of an organization incorporates expenditures and revenues in detail, 
broken down by economic categories, by tasks, sets forth the number of personnel, 
their composition and their wages, sets forth performance indicators, and gives 
detailed explanation for expenditures and revenues. 
Table 3 shows the structure of a budget defined by the Act on Public Finances: 
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 Expenditures  Revenues 
Operational budget Operational budget 
- wages and allowances 
- social security 
- material expenditure 
- financial subsidies for beneficiaries 
- other operative expenditure 
- interest 
 
Capital budget   Capital budget 
- investments at organizational level   
- renovation  
- other investments 
- investments at central level 
- housing subsidies 
- housing construction 
- development related investments outside 
of the public sector  
 
 Loans 
Table 3: The main elements of a budget.  
 
     Legislation sets forth in detail the scopes of authority related to the 
management levels of the budgetary organizations. The top manager of a budgetary 
organization can in his own right reallocate funds within the approved budget within 
the operational and the capital budget, between the operational and the capital 
budget, and can increase or decrease the loans, but this latter cannot be aimed at 
increasing wages or decreasing funds for renovation.  
During the course of the year, the head of the budgetary chapter (in most cases 
the minister) will ensure the efficient use of budgetary funds, number of personnel 
and state assets. The minister will exercise the right to reallocate funds and staff 
number figures within the budgetary chapter. However, it is thought-provoking how 
the leader of the chapter can actually enforce efficient management at the lowest 
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level, when the accounting information system, because of its cash based approach, 
is not even suitable to allocate expenditures to tasks, not to mention cost calculation.  
The head of the budgetary organization is responsible for: 
- the efficient management of the assets of the organization; 
- carrying out the tasks specified in the charter of the organization according to 
legal requirements; 
- ensuring efficiency and economy in the daily management of the given 
organization; 
- providing complete and valid information on plans and on implementation; 
- harmonizing management opportunities and obligations; 
- ensuring adherence to accounting principles; 
- and carrying out continuous monitoring activities, organizing internal audit 
and ensuring its efficient operation.  
As we can see, rules and regulations set requirements for the leader of a 
budgetary organization, which they are incapable of delivering within the current 
conditions. It is impossible to control efficiency, because of the lack of capacities in 
accounting information systems explained above. It is difficult to ensure the harmony 
between opportunities and obligations at the organizational level, since the 
supervising organization defines expenditures, number of personnel and as the 
practice shows, the harmony with tasks does not always exist. 
The budgetary organization is obliged to operate within the framework defined 
in the budget, including the budget appropriations and the number of personnel. The 
budgetary organization cannot amend this framework, unless it is set forth in law, or 
the supervising organization gives the authority to do so in a regulated way. These 
amendments cannot result in an increase of the budgetary requests either in the given 
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budgetary year or in the following years. An independent budgetary organization has 
the right to increase its budget total only from funds remaining from previous years, 
reserves of entrepreneurial activities or surplus revenues.  
The budgetary organization has the right to manage independently the 
approved number of personnel and the personnel related funds. Salaries comprise 
regular and non-regular payments and payments to outside personnel. The sum 
appropriated to payment of bonus is planned within non-regular payments, and this 
can be only up to 8 per cent of regular salaries.  
Savings on regular salaries can be used during the course of the year to pay 
bonus to the employees, but this payment can only be up to 10 per cent of regular 
salaries. Above this level bonus can only be paid in the case of outstanding 
performance, which is an interesting wording of the Hungarian regulation, since 
bonus per definition is supposed to be paid to acknowledge outstanding performance. 
If a budgetary organization decreases the number of personnel during the year, 
funds remaining because of this can also be paid during the budgetary year and the 
following year as bonus. This however cannot exceed 50 per cent of the funds 
originally meant for regular wages.  
Funds remaining from a previous year, can only be used after the amendment 
of the budgetary plan. The centrally managed funds can be used with unchanged 
purpose, mainly to settle accounts generated during the previous year but not paid 
yet.  
Funds remaining from a previous year as a saving on salaries can be used either 
for salaries or for covering other expenses, but funds saved on other budgetary items 
cannot be used for paying salaries.  
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If the unfavorable conditions in the economy or the changes in state 
commitments require it: 
- the government has the right to rearrange the funds remaining from previous 
years; 
- the finance minister is entitled to withdraw these savings from the different 
chapters, if it is not bound with commitments.  
This rule is an obstacle of using funds saved in previous year in an efficient 
way, since the budgetary chapters try to prevent the finance minister from 
withdrawing their savings, and they undertake commitments in haste, regardless of 
professional priorities. 
4.3. Accounting in the public sector 
 
The system of accounting in public sector is different from business 
accounting. Depending on when events appear in bookkeeping, we distinguish 
between three types of accounting systems: 
1. Cash based accounting: transactions appear in the books at the same 
time as the flow of cash, i.e. we account for the amount of money paid or received, at 
the time the payment took place.   
2. Accruals accounting: the objective is to actually shed light on the cost 
and expenses related to a given activity or product. This sort of accounting only 
acknowledges transactions, which were effectuated in a given period, regardless of 
when the transfer of fund took place. Financially unsettled items appear in the books 
in the form of receivables and liabilities. The price of real estate and other fixed 
assets are not debited for the period, when the purchase took place, but are 
depreciated annually, meaning that the depreciation is a cost factor.  
 36
3. Modified cash based accounting: cash based reports are corrected 
from time to time with data based on accruals accounting. 
Until the 1950s in Hungary, budgetary institutions exclusively used single 
entry bookkeeping based on cash flow, in order to register their expenditures and 
revenues. There were separate records kept on assets in quantity and about liabilities, 
which were not linked to general ledger, thus they were not part of a closed system.  
The disadvantage of this bookkeeping system was that the information required 
for the budgetary report, could not be gained from accounting data. In order to 
protect state assets, as of 1 January 1956 double entry bookkeeping was mandatorily 
introduced for central budgetary institutions, where reports on assets and cash 
transactions were prepared in a closed system.  
The accounting of the different budgetary institutions showed a very mixed 
picture even afterwards, because smaller municipalities still used single entry 
bookkeeping, whereas the majority of larger institutions used double entry 
bookkeeping (Harangozó, 1977.). In the sphere of defense, recording assets was even 
more difficult, because analytic records were not unified either in content or in form 
(Korsós, 1982, Kőhidi, 1982.). 
Nowadays, the special rules on reporting of the budgetary organizations are set 
forth in a government directive, which orders the use of modified cash based double 
bookkeeping. The current state accounting system faces several problems: 
- the data of the Budgetary Act do not meet the information requirement of 
decision makers; 
- part of the data is redundant, not transparent and reliability is not certain; 
- the classification system is underdeveloped, no solutions has been found to 
set forth performance requirements and to measure performance;   
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- current and capital transactions are mixed; 
- the system of bookkeeping serves unclear accounting objectives; 
- there is no relationship between planning and implementation; 
- the recording of state assets is unreliable, and principles to value these assets 
are missing e.g. in the case of military assets (Nyikos, 2001.). 
However, legal steps to regulate public sector accounting in law have not been 
taken yet, because there is no urgent circumstance in the public sector, which would 
made it unavoidable. The first Hungarian Act on Public Sector Accounting appeared 
in 1897. Until the mid 19th century, the notion of public sector accounting also 
comprised regulations for Parliamentary approval and budgetary execution. The fact, 
that approval and execution are regulated separately would not cause a problem 
itself, but the two systems have to be compatible with one another.  
Public sector accounting also has to comply with two main requirements: it has 
to provide comprehensive data for the legislative power to show that public funds are 
spent on the approved purposes and at the same time, it has to support the decision of 
local executives in order to provide for efficient management. The room for 
movement granted management cannot curtail Parliamentary control (Kassó, 2001.).  
Accounting in its current form is very lavishing; the two most important users 
of information, the political decision makers and the local executives do not receive 
suitable information. The excessive amount of information is difficult to 
comprehend, the activities of the executive branch are not transparent enough and 
local managers do not face the financial and material consequences of their 
decisions.  
The cost of the use of assets, i.e. depreciation, is not included among the cost 
factors of public services. In the case of companies, depreciation is a cost factor thus, 
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there is no need to have special reserves established for replacing assets. Budgetary 
organizations cannot do this, since if they wish to use a given amount of funds for 
investment, then that has to be approved in the annual state budget, and in the budget 
provision of the organization (Kállainé, 1976.).  
According to Illés, accumulation of assets in the market sector is determined by 
the rate on assets, while in the public sector, the capital requirement is derived from 
the capacity requirement necessary to meet the demand of the service (Illés, 2000.). 
It also has to be added, that the demand for the service in itself is not enough, there is 
a need for also a political consensus on the level of service to be provided.  
The current Hungarian public sector accounting system already comprises the 
basis of controlling, the monitoring system, which means that plans and actual data 
are reported in the same structure. Another important pillar of controlling system, 
feedback, is however missing. There is no thorough analysis of discrepancies and 
thus, the necessary measures are not taken to improve management.  
One of the big deficiencies of the cash based accounting approach is said to be 
the end of the year spending, which international literature calls the hockey-stick 
effect (it means that the straight line of spending during the year turns into a curve 
upward during the last months of the year). 
Spending by budgetary organizations according to the cash flow plans is also 
made difficult by the lengthy public procurement processes, because of which actual 
financial transactions are not effectuated during the same year when the procurement 
process started. 
Many countries have realized that it is more reasonable to add a few percent of 
flexibility to the system, i.e. a certain percentage of a given year’s budget can be 
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rescheduled for the following year. Thus, there is no need for end of the year, in most 
cases professionally unjustified spending.  
It has also been made possible in Hungary to use funds from the given 
budgetary year to pay for contracts that are performed by 30 June the following year. 
In the case of defense organizations, because of the specific character of defense 
markets, this deadline has been extended to 31 December the following year.  
The cash based approach also influences the planning system, since the 
managers have narrow window of opportunity to intervene as to when a given 
invoice should arrive. Thus, the budget is not substantiated in detail, it only outlines 
requirements in general, and the actual allocation takes place during implementation.  
The above-mentioned deficiencies and the unfavorable impact of cash based 
approach on budgetary institutions all points to one direction: the efficient and 
effective management of budgetary organizations requires the transition to accruals 
accounting.  
 
4.3.1. Accruals and Cash Based Accounting 
 
Worldwide, one of the cornerstones of the public administration reform is the 
move from cash based accounting to accruals accounting. A few things need to be 
emphasized in this respect:  
1. The result of these two approaches should be the same on the long 
term, and only the result of a given period should be different.  
2. The accruals accounting provides information earlier about the cost 
related to a given activity or product, because there is no need to wait for the 
financial settlement, it is the physical delivery that is important.  
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3. The difference between accumulated accruals data and the data of 
cash based accounting can be calculated from the amount of receivables and 
liabilities.  
4. In the case of accruals approach, it is possible to interpret unit cost. In 
the case of cash based approach, the time difference between actual performance and 
financial settlement distorts the picture.  
Illés defines two types of accounting systems, one based on natural processes, 
the other based on financial processes. The latter one looks upon expenditure as 
being the cost and does not take into account financially unsettled performance, or 
purchased, but unused resources. To compare the two accounting systems, Illés 
studies the emergence of resources in real and value processes, where stock data 
means the accumulation of resources, and flow data show the use of resources (Illés, 
2002.). 
It is not possible to separate setting requirements against accounting from the 
requirements of management. Traditional budgetary systems tend to focus on input, 
and expenditure of inputs for which the cash based approach is perfectly suitable. 
The cash based approach allows a scrutiny of government spending and the 
implementation of Budgetary Act, and also allows the in-year monitoring of the 
implementation of the budget.  
During the recent decade, with the rising need for efficiency and effectiveness, 
more and more countries have decided to shift to accruals accounting, which does 
not only recognize items that are related to transfer of funds, but allows the 
calculations of the total cost of public services.  
Accruals accounting improves resource allocation, makes it possible to justify 
decision on investment, and by using accrued and deferred assets and liabilities also 
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makes it possible to show future liabilities. It provides for a stricter scrutiny, because 
the executive does not only report on the movement of funds, but also on the status 
of assets they manage. It improves the transparency of government activities, 
because it shows total cost, and provides a more comprehensive picture on the 
impact of government on the economy (Diamond, 2002.)  
The most important benefits of this type of accounting according to Diamond is 
that it helps promote a better analysis of the performance of programs by showing 
their total costs; it provides a more realistic assessment of the financial position of 
the administration through total resources and liabilities; provides wider information 
on decision-making, thus, supports a more efficient use of existing resources; 
improves responsibility of managers for their performance, and because of 
transparency it is an incentive for better performance.  
This transition can only be however, the part of a comprehensive budgetary 
reform. Accounting should serve and not lead this reform, i.e. the budgetary system 
should define the accounting system of the public sector organizations. Since the 
accruals approach can also show the transactions of funds, the cash flow statements 
of companies serve this purpose, the two accounting approaches should not be 
handled as two separate systems excluding one another.  
The issue of the transition from the cash based approach to the accruals 
approach could be articulated by asking why there is a need for more information 
that cannot be provided by the cash based but only by the accruals approach 
(Diamond, 2002.). According to Redburn, it is impossible to draw a distinct line to 
say that on which areas cash based accounting should be used and where the accruals 
approach is necessary (Redburn, 1993.).  
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In order to be able to concentrate from the input side to the output side, we 
need an accounting system which is capable of pairing expenditure to performance, 
and is capable of managing information on performance as comprehensively, and as 
credibly as it can handle financial information.  
The first steps of the transition to accruals approach were taken in New-
Zealand and Australia, but a number of European countries also have some 
experience on this field. About half of the OECD countries use to some extent 
accruals approach, however, there is great variety as to the extent it was introduced. 
Some uses it in the financial report of ministries and agencies, a few use it to prepare 
the report of the public administration, while others use it to prepare the budget, as 
well (OECD, 2002a).  
In Sweden for example, they introduced the system gradually, working from 
bottom towards the top, from agencies to the state budget, and the Netherlands also 
chose a similar method.  In the United Kingdom, the central government has been 
using accruals accounting since 2000/01. France, has only shifted at the local level, 
while Spain still uses a dual system (OECD, 2002b). 
For the time being, it is only New Zealand and Australia who use the accruals 
approach both for their reports and their budget preparation, but of course this cannot 
happen without preparing reports on movements of funds (Churchill, 1992.).  The 
UK, Canada and France plan to roll out the use of accruals approach to the budget in 
the near future. The example of Australia and New Zealand shows, that the use of the 
accruals approach in preparing the budget serves to better identify liabilities that are 
not funded, provide for better asset management, and more efficient allocation of 
resources (OECD, 2002b).  
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Following our accession to the European Union, budgetary institutions 
participating in the distribution of EU funds, have an obligation to prepare reports on 
their performance, using accruals accounting. The accounting information system of 
the public sector continues to be a modified cash based system, thus, the government 
decree on the reporting of the budgetary organizations allows the existence of two 
separate bookkeeping, with the obligation of regular harmonization of the two 
(Lilliné, 2004.). 
On the basis of domestic regulation budgetary institutions are only obliged to 
prepare a regulation for unit cost calculation, if they are involved in regular sales of 
products or services, or if they are involved in any entrepreneurial activities to 
identify the cost. In the guidelines about the unit cost calculation, it is the actual 
expenditure that is regarded as the cost, however these do not cover the conversion of 
the expenditure of the cash based system to cost of the accruals accounting (Juhász-
Kolozsvári, 2003.). 
4.3.2. The macroeconomic basis of the choice of public sector 
accounting  
 
In the public sector, the reason for using cash based accounting is that state 
debt was looked upon as the main indicator for budgetary sustainability and 
intergenerational equity. In the period after the World War II, Keynesian budgetary 
policy reinforced the basis for this choice, although we could find dual budgets in 
many countries, which were divided between capital and current operations. The 
structural deficit and the public debt problems of the majority of OECD countries, 
however shook the confidence in budgetary fine-tuning, thus the emphasis from the 
1990s shifted towards a mid-term budgetary policy (Robinson, 2002.). 
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Public debt is an unjust obligation deferred to future generations. Many say, 
that accruals accounting can provide a solutions to that problem, i.e. if the accruals 
balance is zero, then taxpayers’ collected money will just cover the total cost of 
public services provided during the budgetary year.  
On the capital side, accruals accounting acknowledges depreciation as a cost, 
and not capital expenditure. In terms of incomes, the revenues generated from the 
sale of capital assets are not recognized in this system, contrary to the cash based 
approach. Thus, the balance in the cash based system is more favorable if the 
government does not maintain or does not replace depreciated infrastructure. 
Accruals accounting has a much wider view, thus, can serve much longer-term 
objectives.  
Cash based accounting does not take into account the future impacts of 
government policy and does not calculate with the total economic cost. The 
accounting used in the public sector demonstrates investments in gross terms, which 
includes both the replacement of depreciated assets and additional investments.  
The accruals approach already accounts for consequences when they arise, 
which is an important factor when assessing performance. Another benefit of taking 
into account total costs can be that it is easier to compare the efficiency and the 
performance of the public services provider with a private sector organization 
providing the same or similar services (McGeough, 1997.).  
Javier Salinas looks upon accruals accounting as a tool to stabilize European 
public finances. It is also in favor of accruals accounting that in the European Union, 
a basic precondition of the European Monetary Union is the adherence to the 
budgetary objectives, which requires active measures to be taken by member states. 
There should be tangible measures taken to reduce certain expenditures or programs, 
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or even to cancel them, and it is important to change the budgetary processes in such 
a way that serves to improve the performance of public service programs and the 
distribution of resources (Salinas, 2002). Most of the countries consider accruals 
accounting indispensable for fulfilling the latter requirement.  
4.4. Domestic attempt of transition to accruals accounting  
 
Accruals based management and accounting of the public sector is not a 
novelty in Hungary. Act II of 1979. on Public Finances and the Government Decree 
on its implementation also attempted this (Act on Public Finances 1979, Government 
Decree on Implementing the Act on Public Finances). 
Double-entry bookkeeping introduced in the 1950s at central budgetary 
organizations solved many problems that had existed earlier, however it was not an 
original system tailored to the specific characteristics of the budgetary management, 
but instead an adaptation of business accounting. There was a constant debate on the 
concurrent existence of a cash based and accruals approach. Different authors argued 
with one or the other, many however also accepted the justification for both 
approaches and urged to keep both of them.  
Sárdi was on the opinion, that until the contradiction existing in this dual 
system is not dissolved, there is no chance to expect more results than to register 
economic events. He had the idea of providing a larger scope to the cost calculation 
instead of registering expenditures, because a mechanism that disregards cost 
management cannot increase the efficiency of using available assets (Sárdi, 1979.). 
In the market sector, accruals accounting registers the processes of money-
product-money cycles. In budgetary management, such an interpretation can only be 
used in a very narrow field, since although money becomes service (product), but 
normally the beneficiaries of the service are not obliged to pay for the service. Thus, 
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the budgetary system has to serve different requirements: it has to serve the 
enforcement of the governmental will with the tools of planning, revision, approval, 
modification, financing of budgetary appropriations.  
Tucsni despite this was on the opinion, that double-entry bookkeeping is not in 
contradiction with the essence of budgetary management. Its use is required, because 
it is one single, comprehensive and closed system which registers economic events, 
thus helps to protect public assets and it is such a comprehensive, unified and 
complete system, which paves the way for substantial analysis (Tucsni, 1979.).   
Kállainé also reasoned for the accruals approach and urged the establishment 
of such an information system, which besides well summarizing financial settlement, 
also helps to support financial decisions and the forecast of future events (Kállainé, 
1976.). 
The reform of the public sector accounting was driven by the dissolution of the 
contradiction that accruals double-entry bookkeeping is trying to keep track of the 
processes of an expenditure based planning, management and information system, 
and to justify the expenditure based decisions with accruals information.  
Most of the authors agreed, that the planning of expenditures had to remain in 
place, since this is a key element of the planning and implementation of the state 
budget. The debate was only on to what depth and at what level the planning of 
expenditures and revenues should be required (Dudásné-Harangozó, 1979). 
According to most of the authors, expenditures and revenues can only be a category 
used at organizational level, since it can be planned only at this level with sufficient 
precision.  
In order to decide on accounting system, there has to be a clear-cut separation 
between financing the budgetary organizations and their professional performance. 
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In Tucsni’s interpretation, budgetary organizations carry out general and special 
management tasks.  General tasks can be considered as being the collection of 
revenues and spending the funds i.e. allocation of financial resources, whereas the 
special tasks are basically the given professional area of expertise, i.e. providing 
services from available public funds. According to his opinion, the choice between 
accruals and cash based approach provides an answer to the question whether we 
want the budgetary organizations to better perform in their general or in their special 
tasks.  
According to Tucsni, the accounting system also has to be influenced by the 
position, the organization occupies in the organizational hierarchy. The supervising 
organizations mainly carry out general tasks, they transfer the necessary funds to 
their subordinated organizations, and also collect revenues. Tucsni was on the 
opinion, that it is not necessary to have accruals accounting in order to register 
available funds. It has to be noted however, that the allocation of funds is not a 
process for its own purpose, supervising organizations have to allocate funds 
according to activities and performance of these activities.  
Budgetary organizations conducting operative tasks will record the use of 
budgetary resources in a parallel way both in the cash based and accruals approach. 
Revenues and expenditures should be broken down by the predefined structure of 
budget, whereas costs have to be presented by cost category and by task. With this 
solution, the author is on the opinion, that the implementation of the budget can be 
assessed, and at the same time, accruals based analysis is also catered for (Tucsni, 
1979.). 
According to Sárdi, when talking about the accountability of budgetary 
organizations at lower level in the hierarchy, supervising organizations focus on cash 
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only. However, the activity of budgetary institutions can better be described in 
accruals approach, thus there is a need for cost management (Sárdi, 1979.). 
Budgetary planning, accounting and reporting have at their focus point the 
planning of expenditure broken down by tasks.  The expenditure on a given task can 
only be ascertained with a high level of imprecision, thus it is impossible to use cash 
based figures to prepare a serious analysis, if several tasks are to be carried out 
(Dudásné-Harangozó, 1979.). In the case of the procurement of stocks for instance, it 
cannot be decided which cost center is to bear the burden of the expenditure. In the 
majority of the cases, such expenses were allocated to the highest volume task, and 
then corrected later on. (Kállainé, 1976.). 
The most preferred version thus, could be if cash-flow (expenditures and 
revenues) would be planned at organizational level, whereas in the case of tasks there 
would be cost planning, and the reporting would be executed accordingly. Taking 
into account the development in information technology in the recent past, 
nowadays, there would be an opportunity to establish an information system, where 
having registered the core data once, the system would be capable of generating 
reports for both accruals accounting and cash based accounting.  
According to many, it is not important to monitor costs, because expenditure 
and cost differ very little, and on a longer term this difference is actually nullifying. 
This is true in the case when the activity is constant and do not use much material, 
but in the rest of the cases there could be a more significant difference. Thus, the 
activity of a budgetary organization can only be assessed correctly on the basis of 
accruals approach (Dudás-Harangozó, 1979.). 
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5. International experiences of public sector reforms  
 
In this chapter I would like to identify organizational and regulatory changes 
that have come about as a result of reforms carried out internationally in public 
finances, discussing in detail the experiences of the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the necessary 
preconditions of performance management and not to propose a system that should 
be implemented in Hungary. This latter would require a more comprehensive 
analysis, taking into account the size of the organization, cultural differences and 
many other characteristics.  
5.1. Comparative analysis of international public sector 
reforms 
 
The New Public Management aims to improve the efficiency of public 
administration, for which according to Hood the following are required (Hood, 
1991.):    
- public sector be managed by professional managers; 
- tangible performance norms be defined and implementation measured; 
- there be a greater emphasis on the outcome of the activity; 
- the size of the organizational units should decrease; 
- there should be a move towards competition; 
- the introduction of methods used successfully in the private sector should be 
encouraged; 
- and there should be incentive for an orderly and cost conscious use of 
resources.    
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  The results of New Public Management reforms was reviewed in an OECD 
study with the participation of 10 countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States 
(OECD, 1997.).  
The study reviews the introduction of performance management from four 
different aspects: the objectives and focus, the approach used, institutional 
arrangements, and performance information system.  
 
5.1.1. The objective of the reform and the approach used 
 
In terms of objectives, the study of 10 countries identified 3 main objectives for 
the introduction of performance management, which every country took into account 
with different emphasis3. The improvement of management and internal processes 
gained emphasis in Australia, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United States. Accountability and control was at the focus point in France, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom. The process was motivated by potential savings in 
Canada, but Finland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the US also gave 
significant emphasis to this.  
In terms of approach, authors have separated the top-down or bottom-up 
version, the comprehensive or incremental introduction, and de facto or de jure 
introduction, which I would not discuss in detail in this thesis. 
 
3 Zupkó gives a detailed analysis of the international public sector reforms, and also carried out an 
empirical research with the participation of Hungarian local governments (Zupkó, 2001; Zupkó 
2002.). 
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5.1.2. The impact of the reforms on the institutional arrangements 
 
The organizational structure also underwent changes with the view to 
improving performance and there was an internal pressure on managers and external 
pressure on the organization itself. The administrative character, where adherence to 
predefined rules was the main objective, was shifted in the direction of making and 
letting managers manage, while bureaucratic methods, where public service is 
provided in a monopol situation shifted towards market type solutions.  
It is necessary to study organizational changes caused by the reforms in two 
dimensions, one of which is the centralization of the organizational structure. In the 
centralized approach, the organizational hierarchy is kept between the central 
organizations and the periphery, and there is a strong control over resources (finances 
and personnel). The decentralized model gives a greater window of opportunity for 
the organizations in allocating resources and also prefers the establishment of smaller 
organizations carrying out homogenous activities.  
The other dimension is the implementation of policies and programs. The 
model urging for consolidation integrates programs during the course of 
development, implementation and assessment. The model of decoupling and 
disconnecting gives a larger independence to the organizations for the achievement 
of their professional objectives. On the basis of these two dimensions, the following 
combinations can be identified:  
1. Centralization and consolidation. The solution of traditional 
bureaucracies where there is a strong control over resources and the implementation 
of professional tasks managed centrally on the basis of an organizational hierarchy. 
2.  Decentralization and consolidation. Autonomous organizations 
implement their programs on the basis of central guidelines, coordinate programs 
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covering several organizations, and the lower levels of organization adjust to higher 
level programs.  
3. Centralization and decoupling. Resource management is centralized, 
but the integration of programs is loose, organizations enjoy independence in the 
implementation of their professional programs. 
4. Decentralization and decoupling. Autonomous organizations carry out 
homogenous activities, there are no overarching programs for different organizations, 
the definition, introduction and assessment of programs is not linked in practice.   
The countries studied showed the largest shift towards decentralization, but 
have not yet made comprehensive attempt to implement policies and programs in an 
autonomous way. 
5.1.3. Performance Information System 
 
One of the most important achievements of public sector reforms is the 
Performance Information System, which contains: 
- performance measurement system (measuring activities, outputs, outcomes, 
quality etc.),  
- an adjusted financial management cycle (budgeting, accounting, auditing and 
evaluation),  
- a system of reporting and the status of performance information (public 
accessibility of annual reports, budgetary reports, performance standards)  
- the mechanism of using performance related information (performance 
budgeting, performance related wages),  
- result oriented management support techniques (performance agreements, 
risk management, benchmarking).  
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The content of the performance information system is dependent on the 
philosophy of the public sector reform. Certain countries have concentrated on 
organizational outputs, such as New Zealand, while others on outcomes, Australia 
and the US, or financial results and the quality of service, or customer satisfaction, 
measured with the help of a questionnaire, such as in Denmark.  In the Danish 
system, beneficiaries of the service and potential consumers also play the role in 
measuring and monitoring the quality of service. Surveys were taken at two levels, 
on the one hand at ministry or agency level, while also centrally covering different 
areas. Surveying consumers is used as a way of measuring performance in Finland. 
At the beginning, it was conducted in an ad hoc way, but by today, several ministries 
have established a regular way of using the feedback from consumers by sending out 
questionnaires to them annually.  
Hazafi also calls attention to the integration professional and financial 
performance, since cheap public service is not necessarily positive if it is 
accompanied by the dissatisfaction of consumers. Reversing this, the author is on the 
opinion, that cost is not so important, if the consumer is satisfied, because then the 
public service can be considered successful (Hazafi, 1995.). I disagree on the latter, 
because in my opinion both dimensions are equally important, since being aware of 
the costs, it is not at all sure, that the consumers would also be similarly satisfied.  
When assessing the Performance Information System, it is important to see to 
what extent performance indicators cover the activities and expenditures of the 
organization. The experiences of the studied countries have shown, that there are 
more indicators related to activities than to outputs, and there are more indicators 
measuring output than outcome. The author cites the Dutch example, where over the 
course of two years justification of the budget by performance indicators grew from 
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53 per cent to 66 per cent. At the level of agencies, however, this ratio was between 4 
to 80 per cent, which means that the different areas in the public sector use the 
system with different intensity (OECD, 1997.). 
For market organizations activity based costing is used widely as an important 
management tool to measure performance. The essence of this is that indirect costs 
be allocated in such way that will realistically reflect the role of different activities in 
manufacturing the product. Indirect costs can only be allocated to products to the 
extent that the activities they cover participate in the manufacturing of the product or 
the rendering of a given service.    
The two most important tasks of activity based costing is to plan the system 
that allocates costs in that way, and to define indicators that will characterize the 
contribution of a given activity to manufacture the product or render the service. 
Activity based costing is not only a more precise calculation4 than the traditional 
one, but also a new management approach which analyzes activities according to the 
role they play in the manufacturing of a product5.  Its aim is to identify activities not 
generating added value as comprehensively as possible, and to reduce costs (Koltai-
Tamássy, 1996.). 
When establishing activity based costing system, the optimum (shown in 
Figure 2) is defined at the minimum of the total cost, which is the sum of the cost of 
generating information and the cost resulting from imprecision of management 
decision because of the lack of information. 
 
 
 
 
4 Lázár prepared a comparative analysis on the German and Anglo-Saxon  traditional cost calculation 
systems (Lázár, 2002.). 
5 The cost calculation system of the MoD UK is shown in Annex 1. 
 Cost 
 
Total cost 
 Cost of measurement 
 
Cost of errors  
 Precision 
Figure2: The equilibrium between the cost of imprecision and the cost of measurement  
Source: Kaplan-Atkinson, 2003.  
Before introducing the method, one also has to study whether activity based 
costing can provide more precise information on the basis of corporate processes and 
organizational structure than the traditional method, and to what extent cost 
information determine management decisions (Koltai-Sebestyén, 2003.).  
 
5.2. The American experiences of public sector reform 
5.2.1. Legislative background 
 
In the United States the General Accounting Office, the institution of Congress 
defining the basic principles of accounting and auditing, issued the Standards for 
Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs and Functions, according to which:  
Fundamental principle of democratic societies is that government and their agencies 
handling public funds and having the right to decide on their use have complete responsibility to 
give account of their activities. This responsibility characterizes the governmental processes, even 
if legislation sets this forth in an implicit way. This accountability of government does not only 
need to cover public funds, but also has to cover the way public funds were used, and its 
implication (Herbert at al, 1988.). 
In 1993 acting upon the initiative of Senator William Roth, the American 
legislative issued the Government Performance and Results Act. Many consider the 
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Planning, Programming and Budgeting System of the 1960s, the Management by 
Objectives of the 1970s and the Zero-Base Budgeting as the predecessors of the 
GPRA. 
According to rules set forth by the GPRA, every department and public 
agencies has to prepare a strategic plan, on which it bases its planned performance 
and defines performance goals for the given period. On the basis of these 
departmental level plans, the Office of Management and Budget prepares a 
comprehensive plan of the government, in which the budget of the given agency 
corresponds with the performance to be achieved. During the course of 
implementation the managers have greater flexibility by allowing the waiver of 
various administrative restraints, however, in return there is a much stronger 
accountability for the performance of  programs and operations. Every ministry and 
public agency prepares an annual performance report, in which it compares actual 
performance with the goals set forth in the plan.  
The ministries need to prepare a strategic plan covering 6 years and revised at 
least every 3 years that contains a comprehensive mission statement, sets forth 
general goals and objectives, and the way objectives are to be achieved. It also 
identifies external factors affecting the achievement of goals, the method that is to be 
used for implementation and the way performance assessment is to be carried out.  
The annual performance plan has to set forth:  
- at least one performance goal6 for every program and the area that the given 
organization is involved in,  
- performance indicators for output and outcome,  
- the description of the tools used to validate and verify measured values,  
 
6 A performance goal is the target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective 
(quantitative satadard, value or rate) against which actual performance will be assessed. 
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- a short description of operating processes and skills, technology, human 
resource, information etc. required for meeting the performance goals,  
- a description of the waivers of administrative rules to increase the flexibility 
of management.  
The goals of the annual performance plan are required to be linked to the 
outcomes that the organization wants to achieve, be objective, and be articulated in a 
quantifiable, measurable form (OECD, 2002d).  
The annual performance report contains a comparison of planned and actual 
performance and also an explanation if the performance planned was not achieved. In 
the case of a deviation between planned and actual data, it also has to describe the 
plan and the schedule how the organization whishes to achieve the missed 
performance goal. If the objective in its original form is impractical or infeasible, 
there also has to be proposals made for future modification or cancellation. 
The annual performance report summarizes the program evaluations conducted 
during the year, shows the impact of the waivers of administrative rules and other 
obligations on achieving performance goals. 
The GPRA thus, builds on three main elements: strategic planning; 
performance measurement including the planning, measuring and reporting the 
performance; and the greater flexibility of managers in return for greater 
accountability for results (OECD, 1997.).  
5.2.2. Steps of introduction 
 
The General Accounting Office studied the experiences of countries leading in 
performance management of the public sector and on the basis of this identified three 
steps necessary for implementing performance management. For every step they also 
articulated the practice required which is set forth in Figure 3.  
  Step 1: 
Define Mission and 
Desired Outcomes  
 Practices: 
 1. Involve stakeholders 
 2. Assess environment 
3. Align activities, core 
processes, and resources 
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Step 2: Step 3:  
Measure Performance  Use Performance 
Information Practices: 
4.  Produce measures at each 
organizational level that Practices:  6. Identify performance gaps - demonstrate results, 7. Report information - are limited to the vital few, 8. Use information - respond to multiple 
priorities, and 
- link to responsible 
programs. 
5. Collect data 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Steps of introducing performance management in the USA. 
Source: GAO, 1996.  
 
The strategic plan is the starting point for performance management. The 
strategic plan i.e. the given document is actually issued at the required time, however 
is a much less important part of the planning process than the significance of the 
preparation of this document. Strategic planning cannot be looked upon as a static, 
activity, but instead should be considered as a dynamic, inclusive process.  
When articulating the mission, it is important to place emphasis on involving 
the relevant stakeholders, since during the measurement of performance, their 
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opinion is also to be taken into account, when studying the success of a program. On 
the other hand, if the stakeholders already participate in defining the mission, they 
will better understand the process aimed at establishing a balance between demands 
and scarce resources.  
Osborne and Gaebler studying government approaches have emphasized that 
the mission oriented government is more efficient, successful, innovative and 
flexible than a government driven by predefined rules, and the working moral of the 
staff is also better (Osborne-Gaebler,  1994.). 
Organizations also have to study and understand how processes and activities 
contribute to outcomes and the fulfillment of a mission. Most of the agencies have 
realized that the organizational structure is obsolete and does not meet the 
requirements of the modern times. More emphasis needs to be based on harmonizing 
performance expectations and financing levels, on human resource management and 
on information management. 
Performance measurement makes it possible for organizations to study the 
progress they have made in achieving their objectives. A clear hierarchy of 
performance goals and indicators has to be established to let managers and 
employees see how their daily activity contributes to the achievement of the 
organization’s strategic objectives. 
Information on performance only has real value if actual performance is 
compared with the goals defined in the plan and thus, the management can decide on 
which areas to employ more resources in order to fulfill the mission (GAO, 1996.).  
5.2.3. The experiences of performance management in the US 
Department of Defense 
KIHAGYVA 
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The General Accounting Office studied the performance report of the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) for the year 2000, and uncovered numerous 
deficiencies. According to its performance plan, the DoD wished to achieve the 
following outcomes:  
- to maintain the technological superiority of the US in the field of key military 
capabilities; 
- to have sufficient number of well trained and highly motivated personnel; 
- to continuously maintain the desired level of readiness; 
- to have more efficient and cost effective infrastructure and operating 
procedures; 
- to reduce the availability and the use of illegal drugs; 
- to have fewer erroneous payments.  
According to the findings of the study, it was not possible to define the 
progress the defense portfolio has made in achieving the required outcomes. One of 
the reasons for this was that the outcomes were too complex, interrelated and have 
required several years to achieve. Thus, it was difficult to define the path that leads to 
a gradual achievement of strategic objectives and outcomes. 
According to the findings of the study, part of the performance indicators like 
the characterization of technological advantage by procurement cost did not provide 
a direct link to the required outcome. It was also difficult to comprehensively study 
performance, because in the majority of the areas, some performance indicators were 
met, while others were not, and some were reduced over the course of the year, 
which made it very difficult to assess overall progress. In the case of several 
discrepancies between the plan and actual data the DoD have not identified specific 
 61
                                                
steps and measures, which will help to contribute to the achievement of a given 
performance in the future.  
Nowadays public administration organizations have to change their 
organizational culture in order to become more outcome oriented and consumer 
focused (GAO, 2001.). There is at least 5-7 years required for the full 
implementation of such measures and the radical change of organizational culture. 
According to American studies, taking into account the results of other Departments 
as well, it can be said that even this much time is not enough for a complete 
transition (OECD, 1999.). 
 
5.3. The British experiences of the public sector reform 
 
British reforms were launched in the 1960s and 1970s after the Fulton report, 
while in 1982 the Financial Management Initiative7 was published and it was in 1995 
that a program aimed at the transition to Resource Accounting and Budgeting was 
started (Ashton at al, 1991.). 
The significance of the transition to Resource Accounting and Budgeting lay in 
the fact, that in cash based accounting the cost of resources is registered for the 
period when the transfer of funds were made, while in the case of Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting cost of resources is registered for the period when the 
given resource was used in the interest of a given activity. A further advantage is that 
capital costs are also included in the calculations, so that depreciation carries a real 
meaning.  
 
7 Financial Management Initiative was strongly criticized, because instead of managing people the 
emphasis was on information system and as they said, the government confused management with 
control. 
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In this system Departments have to submit the following reports to the 
Parliament:  
- Summary Resource Outturn: a comparison of actual and planned resources, 
and the reconciliation of resources and funds. 
- Operating Cost Statement: the use of resources, demonstration of cost by 
category. 
- Balance Sheet: a demonstration of assets and liabilities.  
- Cash-flow Statement: to demonstrate the source and the use of funds.  
- A report on the use of resources according to tasks.       
These documents are also supplemented by an unaudited analysis on the 
performance of the organization (Resource, 1999.).  
The British have realized that in order to have an effective organization it is 
important that resource allocation reflect organizational objectives i.e. to finance 
activities which contribute to the achievement of a set of target. If the two systems 
are established independently and accountability and responsibility is not identical, 
this makes a rational distribution of funds impossible.  
In the course of the public administration reform, they have also started to 
establish a controlling system. The following requirements were defined vis-à-vis a 
controlling system in the UK: 
- it should be a clear system, accepted and understood by everyone equally; 
- it should articulate specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time related 
(SMART) objectives; 
- based on performance indicators, which are linked to organizational 
objectives and are difficult to manipulate; 
- the information substantiating these indicators be accurate and reliable; 
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- there should be positive feedback to the extent possible; 
- it should be cost effective; 
- it should result in an open process based on confidence; 
- it should cover both resources and performance; 
- it should provide feedback to the applicable levels; 
- it should provide timely feedback; 
- it should demonstrate to management the impact of their activity on output 
(Resource, 1999.).  
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6. Measuring performance in public administration 
 
The measurement of performance has come to the center of attention during the 
past few decades. Prior to that, the key issue in the public sector was the rule of law 
and adherence to regulations, which of course continues to be a requirement, 
however, there is also a new dimension that needs to be managed.  
With the decreasing role of the state, and tax reductions to help international 
competitiveness – at the same time reducing budgetary resources – it has become 
more and more important to make public administration more efficient despite the 
lack of resources and by doing so reject criticism aimed at the quality of public 
services (Király, 1999.).  
According to an OECD study of 2002, Hungary is still in the group of 
countries with high level of spending, where the ratio of public spending to the GDP 
is close to 50 percent (Cekota at al, 2002.). The desired reduction of this ratio would 
entail financial austerity measures or the introduction of efficient management 
methods.  
This also contributed to the fact that regulation of public finances prescribes as 
of 2004 that the annual report also has to mention steps taken to improve cost 
efficiency and their short description should also be accompanied by a numerical 
analysis of their impact.  
6.1. Basic definitions of performance management 
 
Measurement of performance has a very wide literature8 even in the case of 
public administration, and although the most of the literary sources start with the 
 
8 Dolgos provides a comprehensive analysis of the literature on measuring the performance of market 
organizations (Dolgos, 2000.). 
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difficulty of defining and measuring performance, finally, through certain 
compromises, they propose comprehensive performance assessment systems.   
In this chapter I will only concentrate on measuring the performance of an 
organization, and I will not study the possibilities of measuring individual 
performance (Bóday, 1993, Linder, 1993, Krisztián, 2001, Vassné, 2001, Takács, 
2002a, Takács, 2002b).  
The Hungarian dictionary defines performance as the following: the 
measurable result of a given activity (Hungarian dictionary, 2003.).  Performance, 
thus, is per definition related to some sort of activity, is the result of conscious work, 
and already its definition sets forth the requirement for measurability.  
First of all let us study the subject of measurement i.e. what we wish to 
measure. In relation to performance, international literature separates the input-
output-outcome triangle. Input is the resources used in the interest of a given activity, 
which is relatively well measurable. Although, in cash based accounting we record 
the items of cash transactions not the costs, and pairing them with a given activity 
entails problems.  
Output is the result of an organizational activity, which shows what sort and 
what amount of activity was performed during a given period. The outcome shows 
what sort of objectives could the organization fulfill, what requirements of 
consumers were met and to what extent a value was generated. 
Measurement of performance supposes that we are capable of somehow 
operationalize these three notions, and then compares them to each other. Depending 
on which items we compare, we can talk about economy, efficiency, effectiveness 
and value for money measurement9.  
 
9 The National Audit Office of Denmark applies the term „cost effectiveness”, instead of „value for 
money” (Planning, 2004.). 
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The three Es, economy, efficiency and effectiveness are defined by Vígvári 
according to the following: economy means the minimalization of cost of resources 
used for a given activity. Efficiency shows the unit cost of the output of an activity, 
whereas effectiveness means the actual achievement of the objectives. The value for 
money principle says, that every expenditure is justified if it realizes actual or virtual 
added value (Vígvári, 2002.). According to the opinion of Király, the essence for 
value for money is that the results of internal activities of an organization do reach 
the segment of the external world that they wish to direct it to (Király, 1999.). 
 The government decree regulating the management in the public sector 
mentions in its amendment effective as of 1 January 2004 the requirements for the 
3Es with the following definitions:  
- economy: the optimalization of the cost of resources used for a given activity, 
while reaching an adequate level of quality. 
- efficiency: the relationship between products, services and other results of a 
given activity, and the resources used for generating them. 
-  effectiveness: the value of realizing the objectives of a given activity, the 
relationship between the intended and the actual impact of that activity. 
The decree also set forth that budgetary organizations are obliged to ensure 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness during the course of their activity (9. § (8)). 
The National Audit Office of Denmark divided management activities into four 
areas and besides budgetary management it separated resource management, which 
aims to define the quantity and the composition of resources involved in the 
production process, activity management, which concentrates on defining output or 
activities, and performance management, which studies the achievement of 
objectives (Planning, 2004.). Figure 4 demonstrates that approach.  
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Figure 4: The management approach of the National Audit Office of Denmark. 
Source: Planning, 2004. 
The British reform program mentioned earlier has defined the 3Es as the 
following: economy measures the cost of input i.e. how much it costs to procure one 
unit of a resource. Efficiency measures the quantity of input used for producing one 
unit of output, whereas effectiveness is the ratio of outcome and output. Figure 5 
shows the relationship between the latter two.  
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Operational 
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Figure 5: Efficiency vs effectiveness. 
Source: Resource, 1999.  
Low High 
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Using a mathematical formula, if we multiplied the three Es, we receive the 
value for money i.e. outcome/input costs, which expresses the cost at which we were 
able to meet the requirements of the society and the value that the organization had 
generated.  
Figure 6 shows the operating processes of a performance oriented organization.  
 
Strategic 
plan  
 
 
 
 
 Management 
control  
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Resources    Activities Output Outcome Effect 
Economy  Efficiency Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure 6: Operational processes of a performance oriented organization. 
Source: OECD, 1996a. 
 
6.2. The objectives and requirements of performance 
measurement 
 
McKewitt and Lawton have studied the objective of performance measurement 
and have defined three functions for it in public administration: 
1. Organizational function: the definition of such norms which define the 
most important objectives and values of the organization strengthening the 
commitment of the organizational players to fulfill these objectives. 
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2.  Management function: continuous source of information on the 
relationship between actual and planned performance, thus providing the possibility 
for intervention.  
3. Technical function: provision of information for the stakeholders 
about the performance of an organization.  
The indicators measuring the performance need to meet several requirements 
both in public and private sectors (Király, 1999.): 
- Homogeneity. In order to compare organizational units, the same indicators 
need to have the same substance, and the circumstances of measurement also need to 
be the same.  
- Applicability. The object measured needs to depend on the operation of the 
given organization.   
- Diversity by organizational level. Different indicators have to be used to 
measure the same activity depending on the organizational level, but identical 
indicators have to be applied at identical levels.  
- Avoidance of side effects. Indicators have to be chosen so, that the attempt to 
increase them does not lead to the emergence of undesirable side effects.  
- Rationality. This criterion refers to the balance between the cost and benefit. 
One has to refrain from using indicators that measure performance precisely, but are 
too expensive to generate.  
- Multifaceted nature. In case of diverse activities, different indicators need to 
be used or one complex indicator is necessary, that is suitable to measure collectively 
the activities of the organization.   
It is important to emphasize that performance indicators in themselves 
represent little information for their users. The assessment of performance can be 
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more meaningful if carried out by comparison, which might have different versions 
depending on the purpose of the assessment: 
1. Fulfillment of norms. A comparison of performance standard and 
actual performance.  
2. Measurement of progress. A comparison in time, how performance 
developed in comparison to earlier periods. 
3. Organizational comparison. The comparison of the performance of the 
organizational units involved in the same activity. 
4. Optimal performance. Compares the actual indicator of performance 
with an optimum value based on a method or a collection of methods used earlier. 
 One of the important requirements of performance measurement is that one 
should not only concentrate on easily measurable dimensions, because the 
management might become disinterested in safeguarding long term values. 
Illustrating it through the case of the Hungarian Defense Forces, in the current 
situation one of the key issues is the establishment of an appealing image, since from 
2005 contract solders have to be recruited instead of the several thousands of 
conscripts in the Armed Forces.  
In public sector there have not yet been defined a method how several different 
indicators could be transformed into one single indicator that covers the totality of 
the organizational performance. Market organizations do not only pursue one single 
objective, nevertheless the market provides economic indicators that help to assess 
performance, such as the profit, market share, or rate on assets.  
In the market sphere, measuring financial performance can be the basis for 
assessing organizational performance, because the revenues generated by the 
company are also defined by performance. However, in the public sector the revenue 
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side in the majority of the cases is the result of a political agreement and only a 
narrow scope of revenues can be defined by the performance of a budgetary 
organization.  
The problem of aggregating performance indicators is that they show different 
dimensions, there are several possible methods of measuring performance, and the 
requirement of several consumers has to be taken into account. Although public 
opinion often criticizes the quality of state services, this discontent is only based on 
impressions and not on some well-defined indicators. 
Thus, we need a sound, transparent and robust process of aggregation, which 
results in one comprehensive indicator figure to show how efficient the organization 
was in transforming inputs into output, which is capable of managing information on 
inputs and outputs simultaneously, the indicator is not dependent on weighing figures 
or prices used, and which is capable of handling quality data besides quantity data 
(Miller, 1984.). 
The measurement of performance can yield significant results in solving the 
financing problem of budgetary organizations. Organizations can be financed on the 
basis of previous year budget, until there are no clear performance requirements 
related to their tasks (Nyikos, 2001.). Osborne and Gaebler stated this by saying that 
a result oriented administration will finance outcomes and not expenditure (Osborne-
Gaebler, 1994.). 
Sally and Nagy thought it was too early that after 1989 the confused 
mechanism of budgetary bargaining was replaced by normative support. According 
to their opinion, there was not enough time to establish harmony between the 
indicators of the budgetary plans and the report and between other professional 
statistics (Sally-Nagy, 1994.).  
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The establishment of task related financing supposes that the accounting 
system is also made suitable to support financing, i.e. instead of a classification by 
economic categories the emphasis would be shifted to a functional classification.  
The functional classification of revenues and expenditure in public finances is 
already operational, although the system requires significant modernization. 
Currently the functional classification is based on the classification system used in 
the European Union. The system classifies the different organizations according to 
their most characteristic activity, but of the 17 different sectors of national economy, 
only 4 detail public services.  
The system does not really allow budgetary organizations performing 
heterogeneous activity to reclassify certain smaller volume activities into other 
sectors. This heterogeneity is all the more characteristic of the Hungarian defense 
sector, since beside defense organizations the budget contains the operation and 
maintenance of secondary and higher level educational institutions for military 
personnel, hospitals, recreation facilities, cultural centers, etc. 
This classification is also criticized because of artificially maintaining sectors 
that have a very low volume, while the miscellaneous category is in certain cases too 
exaggerated, thus, there would be a need to further refine and reclassify tasks.  
 
6.3. Models established to increase performance 
 
We can measure the performance of public administration from a political 
aspect – the ability to make public/collective decisions – and on the basis of service 
delivery – efficiency and effectiveness. 
John Kirlin states that public administration should not be defined on the basis 
of its observable manifestation, since public administration’s most important task is 
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to promote social decision making and action, and not to provide services. On the 
basis of the standard public choice theory, the joint, unstructured decision of 
individuals pursuing opposite interest is irrational, unstable and unpredictable.  
Budgetary institutions play an important role in establishing stability and 
predictability (Salinas, 2002.).  
Kirlin is on the opinion that measurement of performance also has to be 
established on a wider definition of governance. He separates three different cases:  
- if there is a consensus in terms of the objectives and their efficient realization, 
then detailed central guidelines and controls are justified; 
- if there is a consensus in terms of the objectives, but there is a disagreement 
in the implementation strategy, then incentives have to be used (rewards and 
punishments); 
- if there is no consensus either in terms of the objectives or the method of 
implementation, then an interactive bargaining and learning strategies are 
recommended (quoted Miller, 1984.). 
The measurement of services and outputs can also be approached from two 
different aspects: we can measure the achievement of organizational objectives and 
the quality of internal processes. In many countries they try to improve the efficiency 
of budgetary organizations through measures such as reorganization, publicity, and 
the introduction of management methods to improve decision-making and 
information processing.  
Johnson and Lewin identified four different categories of management 
approaches aimed at increasing performance in the public sector (quoted Miller, 
1984.). The so called (1) goal models place a great emphasis on the specification of a 
hierarchy of goals and organizational objectives. According to the (2) system model 
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better organizational performance is generated through a more efficient 
organizational structure.  
The goal model, which is quite frequent in military organizations, looks upon 
an efficient organization as such that establishes its objectives, defines the activities 
required to achieve them, and then appropriates the necessary resources to the 
activity.  
While the goal model concentrates on the achievement of organizational 
objectives, the system model states that the requirement and the expectations vis-à-
vis a given organization change so swiftly, that it is impossible to cover the complete 
scope of activity with a finite number of organizational objectives, thus in many 
cases it actually fails to measure organizational performance. Organizational 
efficiency is looked upon as being such a complicated concept to measure, that in 
most of the cases it is characterized as being a combination of the quality of different 
system characteristics.  
Instead of defining the concept of efficiency, there is an attempt to establish a 
group of variables that according to assumptions will lead to efficiency. Such could 
be environmental characteristics (input variables, output variables) characteristics of 
individuals (motivation, incentives), structural characteristics (centralization, 
decentralization, hierarchy, management attitude and style).  
In contrary to the afore mentioned, literature based on systems analysis and 
operational research – 3) the planning models of decision-making systems – attribute 
efficiency and effectiveness to an appropriate structure of planning and decision-
making.  
Based on the economic sense of efficiency, an organization generating the most 
output from a given amount of input will be called efficient, just as the one achieving 
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a given output level with the least amount of input. That is if the organization is 
efficient enough, then the allocation of resources is Pareto optimal, and the 
reallocation of resources can only generate new value to the detriment of values 
elsewhere.  
This principle in order to improve the efficiency of government programs 
considers it important to measure input and output and to compare allocation of 
resources in order to improve the system (by establishing alternative programs). The 
first substantial use of this structured comparison based system was the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System. This system was widely used in the 1960s in 
the United States of America, but later disappeared, or transformed or certain 
elements of it were used under a different name.  
The zero-base budgeting tries to structure resource allocation decisions on the 
basis of performance of programs. When justifying the budget of agencies and 
programs not only the difference to the previous year needs to be justified, but the 
base figure as well (Illés, 2002.).  
Despite the work intensity required by the zero-base budgeting, it has generated a 5-15% 
saving in administrative budget and overheads, and has proven to be a suitable tool to curtail 
expenditure. While studying the general costs, the process also attempts to unravel unnecessary 
functions, parallel and overlapping activities. Going bottom up in the organizational structure, 
budgetary requests have to be justified in detail, several solutions have to be set forth by each 
function. One alternative has to study the consequences of abandoning a function, which beside 
savings and benefits caused by the abandonment of such a function also analyze the drawbacks of 
this decision (Illés, 2002.). 
Although the planning model of decision-making system tries to measure input 
and output, it is significantly restricted in the sense that it does not measure output 
for the totality of the organization. The comprehensive performance of the 
organization is defined as a result of the decision-making structure and other internal 
processes, just as in the system model, and is not an independent concept.  
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Finally 4) management sciences models depending on the characteristics of a 
decision (scope, organizational position, regularity, substance, final implementation) 
will use different analytic methods (mathematic programming, decision trees, 
simulations etc.) (Miller, 1984.). 
The so-called Business Excellence Model of the European Foundation of 
Quality Management has been used in the private sector for quality management 
since the 1980s with the aim to increase performance. In the international practice, 
the quality management model used for public administration is the Common 
Assessment Framework (CAF), developed upon a mandate from the European 
Union.  
The CAF system itself was developed from the EFQM model, which provides 
incentives to the organization for continuous control of performance and continuous 
quest for development opportunities. The system is mostly criticized for its 
subjectivity, since it is based on a self-assessment of the employees, although they 
have to prepare during the course of this assessment to defend their opinion publicly. 
The model analyses 9 criteria of which 5 pertain to the organizational 
characteristics (leadership, strategy and planning, human resource management, 
consumer relations, process and change management), whereas 4 pertain to the 
performance of the organization (customer orientation, employee satisfaction, social 
influence, effectiveness) (Szente, 2003.). The objective of the system is not to 
unravel the shortfalls of employees, but instead to find the weak points of the 
processes and the system, and improve them (Sümegi, 2003.). 
The CAF has already been used in the Hungarian public administration in the 
case of a few organizations, and there is more incentive to introduce it, because as of 
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2004, expenditure related to the introduction of a quality control system can be 
activated among the assets as cost of foundation and reorganization (Lilliné, 2004.).  
Beyond the models described earlier, many authors expect the improvement of 
government performance from the feedback received from the citizens, thus, they 
propose that the budgetary reports and information on the organizational 
performance be published. 
6.4. Performance budgeting 
 
According to Diamond, the changes of the accounting system should follow 
and not lead a comprehensive budgetary reform. When introducing accruals 
accounting, the responsibility for processes could be replaced by responsibility for 
results. This would be the basis of a new performance budgeting model, the main 
elements of which are the following: 
- preliminary and unambiguous specification of performance expected from 
agencies; 
- decentralized decision-making, providing the necessary autonomy to the 
managers of an organization in order to achieve the target set; 
- incentives and sanctions, which urge the managers to promote the 
government interest; 
- preliminary agreement on information required for performance assessment; 
- a clear process of performance assessment in which actual performance is 
compared with plans approved earlier. 
Performance indicators are relevant, if falling behind or performing over a set 
target has its consequences both at organizational and individual levels. In most of 
the countries, performance information however does not have an impact on the 
budget.  
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The model for accountability in New Zealand is based on two important 
distinctions. One of them is the distinction between the interest of owners and 
consumers. The state in most of the cases is the owner of budgetary organizations, 
and it is the consumer of their services. The state as a consumer will define 
requirements vis-à-vis services, i.e. it will define the desired outcome, whereas the 
organization rendering the service will concentrate on the output (Webster, 1998.). 
Diamond argues that the advantage of accruals accounting is that it makes it possible 
to have a more distinct separation of these two interests, and to define the trade-off 
between the two.  
   The other important distinction is the one between output and outcome. The 
managers can be held accountable for things, over which they have influence. 
Outcome, however is dependent on many factors that a certain manager cannot 
influence. In New Zealand, the manager of a budgetary organization is responsible 
for generating a given output according to the price and requirements agreed with the 
minister, while the minister is responsible for selecting and defining the impact of 
outputs on the community, i.e. for the outcomes (Diamond, 2002.). 
This complies with the requirement articulated by Weber, for exercising 
external political control over the bureaucracy, which states that politics and the 
different competency areas of bureaucracy and their related rights and 
responsibilities have to be separated. Politicians will set political targets, thus it is the 
responsibility of politics to select the desired outcomes, and it is the task of the 
bureaucracy to implement these in an efficient way (quoted by Gulyás, 2001.). 
Diamond also emphasizes that it is only possible to make a manager 
accountable, if we loosen strict regulations and managers are granted some sort of 
influence. This approach led to the modification of rules and regulations on the 
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employment of civil servants in many countries introducing budgetary reforms, 
which have made it possible for the manager of an organization to have a say in the 
selection of human resources (Diamond, 2002.).   
The fact that instead of the inputs we are concentrating on outputs will not 
cause and automatic emergence of a link between budgetary allocation and 
performance. In the case of New Zealand, the above-mentioned link is the strongest, 
because the approved budget prepared in accruals approach is based on the 
agreement in which the minister and the head of agency agrees on the conditions of 
output procurement. The output expected from ministries and the financial 
performance is shown in one single report, which also set forth the budgetary 
requirements.  
The system in New Zealand however, has been subject of criticism during the 
recent years, because it places a greater emphasis on the measurement of output vis-
à-vis outcome, and does not study whether programs achieve the desired impact. 
Therefore, the system is capable of generating output in a cost efficient way, using 
innovative and consumer focused solutions, but it is inappropriate to decide what to 
do if technical efficiency prevails, but allocational efficiency does not (OECD, 
2002c).  
  The use of the annual report is more and more popular to provide a link 
between budgetary and performance information. Australia, Sweden, Finland, 
Canada are all heading in this direction, because according to their opinion, 
budgetary restrictions are better incentives for managers to terminate unnecessary 
spending, than performance orientation (Diamond, 2002.). 
In summary, inputs are still very important budgetary guidelines, and the 
relationship between performance and budget is not direct and automatic. The 
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pressure related to budgetary restrictions shifts the use of performance information 
towards ex-post analysis.  
6.5. Performance audit 
 
Performance audit in terms of subject studied has two different types. 
Substantive audit ex-post studies the performance of programs or activities, 
compares it to a given standard, whereas a system audit studies the adequacy of 
performance information and their use.  
Performance audit, as it is in its name, is related to auditing. Table 4 shows the 
differences between traditional audit, performance audit and program evaluation.  
 
 Traditional audit Performance audit Program 
evaluation 
Image of 
government 
Bureaucratic 
machinery 
InputÆprocessÆ 
ÆoutputÆoutcome 
The objective of 
government 
intervention is to 
solve collective 
problems 
Meaning of 
efficiency 
The performance of 
activities and tasks 
are defined by 
efficiently regulated 
processes 
The optimalization of 
organizations and 
activities depends on 
objectives and 
restrictions 
A program achieves 
its objectives if 
collective welfare 
improves 
Primary 
objective  
Adherence to 
regulations 
Accountability on 
performance 
To provide useful 
feedback on the 
efficiency of the 
program 
Table 4: Comparison of traditional audit, performance audit and program evaluation.  
Source: OECD, 1996a.  
 
The performance auditors ascertain whether tools used are in harmony with the 
objectives and the possibilities. Performance audit contrary to its name is not closely 
related to auditing. One should however not forget that one of the objectives of 
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traditional audit is also a study of performance. We could say that traditional audit is 
such a performance audit, where performance means economy, i.e. the use of inputs 
without excess.  
Accountability on performance also creates some requirements vis-à-vis 
accounting. An accounting system will be suitable if it can demonstrate that public 
funds were used efficiently and effectively. Its specification depends on how we 
measure efficiency and effectiveness.  
The difficulties lying in the process of performance assessment also reinforce 
the need for performance audit, review and assessment. One has to study the choice 
of indicators (validity, suitability) collection of data and analysis (reliability), quality 
of information (precision, completeness) the standards and criteria of assessment, the 
explanation of results and the relevance and adequacy for decision-making. 
In the United States of America, the General Accounting Office also extended 
its scope of authority to performance audit and program evaluation. It has studied 
adherence to financial regulations, economy, efficiency, effectiveness and the 
applicability of tools used to achieve targets and objectives.  
In New Zealand, performance information also has to be audited, during which 
the precision and the comprehensive nature of information is studied. In the UK it is 
only the financial report that is audited, whereas performance related information is 
not. In Australia adequacy to decision-making is studied, while in Canada they study 
the monitoring of processes aimed at achieving economy and efficiency and also 
processes measuring and reporting the effectiveness of programs.  
In conclusion, we can state the following:  
- in many cases it is the measurable, yet not important area of activities that are 
measured; 
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- the establishment of a system of measurement is sometimes too hasty; 
- financial objectives still have a higher priority contrary e.g. to the quality of 
service; 
- the trade-offs between quality and efficiency are sometimes unclear; 
- there are often no clear indicators attached to general objectives; 
- the achievement of target numbers is frequently over emphasized instead of 
the achievement of objectives; 
- time series are not established, which makes comparison difficult (OECD, 
1997.). 
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7. Balanced Scorecard 
7.1. The basic idea 
 
There have been numerous attempts in public administration to tailor the 
methods used with success in the market sector. One of such attempts was the 
Balanced Scorecard system, which tries to transpose the vision and the strategy of 
the organization into such a comprehensive system of indicators which at the same 
time also defines the strategic framework of performance assessment and 
management.  
It tries to establish a balance between four different perspectives: financial, 
customer, internal business processes, and learning and growth. At the same time it 
also establishes a link between corporate strategy and operative management. It sets 
forth in a comprehensive report the most important factors for an organization 
(Kaplan-Norton, 1999.). 
According to the definition of Lawton, the Balanced Scorecard is such an 
integrated report that shows which dimensions of performance are the most 
important for an organization. It is balanced, because it sets forth in one single report 
all the most important objectives and indicators relevant to different dimensions and 
thus, it provides a multidimensional and comprehensive picture of the organizational 
performance (Lawton, 2003.). 
Hársvölgyi and his co-authors look upon the Balanced Scorecard as the 
collection of interrelated targets, success factors, indicator numbers, and target 
values, which together describe the strategy of the organization, thus sets the paths 
which allows the implementation of the strategy (Hársvölgyi at al, 2002.). Hence, the 
Balanced Scorecard is not a tool for setting the strategy, but more for implementing 
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the strategy, which establishes the relationship between strategic and management 
control.  
Kaplan and Atkinson used the management accounting to measure all the four 
dimensions of the Balanced Scorecard. In the case of operational processes, they 
have considered it important to measure the length, the cost and the quality of the 
process, while for human resources the key dimensions are the retention of the 
employees and the coverage of strategic posts (Kaplan-Atkinson, 2003.). 
Management science tends very frequently to criticize accounting based 
corporate management, because resources and factors that do not appear in the 
balance sheet according to current rules become more and more important. 
According to Lengyel, significant part of the difference between book value and 
market value of a company is the intellectual capital, which can be divided into three 
parts: client capital (customers), structural capital (operational processes), human 
capital (learning and development). The Balanced Scorecard provides an opportunity 
for the conversion of intellectual capital into financial capital at a strategic level 
(Lengyel, 2001.). 
A similar tool mentioned in French literature is the Tableau the Bord (dashboard), which 
was already used in the first decades of the past century to improve manufacturing processes by 
identifying the cause and effect relationship between activities. This system measures performance 
through the following steps (Wimmer, 2000.): 
- identifying organizational objectives; 
- specifying alternative actions (what kind of action is required to achieve the given 
objective); 
- identifying the person responsible for meeting the objective; 
- specifying the indicators appropriate to monitor objectives and alternative action; 
- compiling the Tableau the Bord, developing the form and content of reports generated for 
the different levels of management. 
Both the American and the French approaches emphasize that the system of performance 
management should support the achievement of strategic objectives and apart from financial 
information, non-financial information should also be used to measure performance. Both tools are 
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suitable to provide an incentive to management to articulate a clear, widely accepted strategy 
(Epstein-Manzoni, 1997.). 
Epstein and Manzoni also emphasize that the majority of companies generate reports on the 
non-financial dimension of performance, but the great advantage of Balanced Scorecard and its 
French equivalent is that all these are summarized in one single document. Numerous French 
authors look upon the Tableau the Bord as a more wider ranging general tool, while the Balanced 
Scorecard is a special case of the Tableau de Bord (Bourguignon at al, 2001.).   
Bourguignon and his co-authors were critical of the Balanced Scorecard and called 
attention to the need to study the cultural environment before its implementation. They have 
identified as a common characteristic that both systems are geared to eliminate the dominance of 
financial indicators and place the emphasis on pro-active rather than reactive intervention, while 
articulating the need for only a few, but very important variables (Bourguignon at al, 2001.). 
 
7.2. The Hungarian experience of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard 
 
Several Hungarian companies have experience in implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. They look upon it as a tool, which can provide spectacular results in 
implementing the corporate strategy. Its importance is also justified by the fact that 
no organization can achieve permanent success and development without assuring 
that the employees know the strategy.  
To highlight the importance of knowing the strategy and the importance of the 
relationship between the strategy and the daily operation Szegedi cites the survey of 
Fortune Magazine, which concluded that 90 percent of organizations are incapable of 
realizing their strategies (Figure 7). 
 
 60% of the organizations do 
not link the budget to strategy  
 
 86
 
 
9 out of 10 
organizations are 
incapable of 
implementing their 
strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The link between strategy and daily operation. 
Source: Fortune Magazine, quoted by Szegedi, 2003. p. 204. 
The Balanced Scorecard does not imply the need to continuously perfect every 
internal process. On the contrary, it is a tool to help organizations to concentrate on 
value generating and important core processes. The so-called critical success factors 
provide the basis for the definition of the most important processes and they 
continuously monitor and improve these indicators (Kaplan-Norton, 2002.).  
Várkonyi sees the benefits of the Balanced Scorecard in that it provides well-
articulated and structured objectives based on the strategy, shows the relationship 
between objectives, and on the long term, it also allows the study of the relationship 
between objectives and their review. The Scorecard is an excellent tool to 
disseminate strategy within the organization and it helps the allocation of resources 
to the places most needed (Várkonyi, 2003.). 
In order to maintain transparency, the Balanced Scorecard is capable of 
defining and managing the maximum of 25-30 indicators derived from 
organizational strategy. When defining these indicators, one has to pay attention to 
assuring a balance between lagging indicators and leading indicators. Table 4 shows 
85% of managers 
spend less than an 
hour per month on 
strategic issues 
95% of employees do 
not understand strategy 
75% of managers do not link 
different actions and initiatives to 
strategy 
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the differences between traditional measurement of performance and Balanced 
Scorecard Indicators.  
 
BSC indicators Traditional indicators 
They only concentrate on strategic areas Measure the complete scope of 
operation 
Organized according to a logical sequence There is no cause-effect relationship 
Planned figures are always derived from 
strategy 
Planned figures are not always derived 
from strategy 
Expectations are articulated for a longer 
period  
Target values are articulated for a 
shorter period 
The strategy is communicated The strategy is not communicated 
Actions are defined for every objective 
and indicator  
Actions are not defined for every 
objective and indicator 
Table 5: The comparison of Balanced Scorecard indicators and traditional indicators.  
Source: Várkonyi, 2003,  p.201. 
On the basis of the Hungarian experience in implementation, it can be said that 
implementation is only possible through an incremental process and on a project 
basis, in larger organizations it is impossible without any information technology 
support, and there is a constant need for the training of participants to keep them 
informed and to establish their commitment. The selection of indicators and the 
setting of target values has to be managed from the top by involving the relevant 
areas of expertise, the concentration should be on core activities, and there is a need 
for continuous revision of the indicators.  
The popularity of the Balanced Scorecard shows, that there is more and more 
interest in measuring and improving performance both in the public and in the 
private sector. Lawton however, draws attention to a frequently committed mistake: 
organizations tend to use the Balanced Scorecard as a dashboard, and concentrate 
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purely on reaching the target value of indicators instead of meeting objectives and 
implementing strategy. In order to avoid accidents, it is wiser to look out through the 
windshield to the road, instead of continuously looking at the dashboard (Lawton, 
2003.). 
A fundamental change in the basic circumstances (a change in top 
management), the poor quality of the Scorecard (too many, too few or unbalanced 
indicators), and problems arising during implementation (lack of commitment of the 
management, insufficient number of employees involved, extended delay in 
implementation) can cause the failure of the Balanced Scorecard (Lengyel, 2001.).  
 
7.3. The Balanced Scorecard in the UK Ministry of Defense 
 
The British Ministry of Defense also attempted to introduce the Balanced 
Scorecard. According to their study the benefits of the Balanced Scorecard lie in the 
fact, that it allows a more focused management, more balanced decision making, 
flexibility, and its clear and transparent form supports decision-making. They 
identified as disadvantages that the Balanced Scorecard is only worth as much as the 
information behind it, and because of the difficulties in operationalization and 
measurement, its assessment is subjective (Performance, 2000.). 
Prior to implementation, the MoD studied how the perspectives used in the 
entrepreneurial sector can be interpreted in the public sector, in particular in the field 
of defense. They have come to the conclusion that the number of perspectives should 
not be changed, it is only their name and their substance that has to be somewhat 
modified. (The strategic map of the UK MoD is shown in Annex 2.)  
Customer perspective, since in a business sense the Ministry does not have 
actual consumers, was changed to Output/Deliverables. The substance of the 
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Financial perspective differs from the perspective used for companies, because the 
objective here is not the profit, but an efficient and effective use of resources. Thus, 
it was transformed into Resource Management.  
The Learning and Growth perspective was named building for the future, 
although development here does not imply the development in quantity, rather in 
quality, especially in terms of human resources, information technology, research 
and development. The Operational Processes are named Enabling Processes, to 
highlight their importance in increasing performance.  
Strategic objectives were transformed into the four perspectives according to 
the following:  
1. Outputs/Deliverables: successful operations, the establishment of a 
well prepared Armed Force, defense structure complying with the defense review, 
capabilities, and the implementation of the defense policy.  
2. Resource Management: the preparation of a well-balanced program, 
the control of annual expenditure, balanced human resource figures, the 
implementation of annual investments in military technology, building reputation. 
3. Enabling Processes: the improvement of teamwork, benefiting from 
accruals accounting and smart procurement, introduction of performance 
management.  
4. Building for the Future: developing the personnel for the future, 
strategic assessment, use of information, research and technology (Hally, 2004.). 
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8. The Hungarian prospects of performance 
management in public sector 
 
Studying the reform attempts and their failure in Hungary, Hazafi says that in 
the majority of the cases, it did not look for increasing performance, rather it tried to 
adapt methods successfully implemented elsewhere, but disregarding the values 
related to the social and the cultural environment (Hazafi, 1995.). This is furthermore 
justified by another survey according to which public sector managers look upon the 
organizational culture and the leadership style as being less changeable than 
organizational strategy (Dinya, 2002.). 
One however has to take into account that certain reforms in other countries 
have actually resulted in a change of the organizational culture, hence the failure of 
the Hungarian reform attempts sometimes was rooted in the selected method, or in 
the timing and the schedule of implementation, in the communication, and in the lack 
of necessary conditions for implementation. 
To illustrate it with the transition to accruals accounting and the 
implementation of performance management, it is useless to implement accruals 
accounting, if we do not use the extra information to improve organizational 
performance. However, if we only try to implement performance management, but 
our accounting system cannot provide the necessary information for performance 
indicators, then we are doomed for failure, although both reforms in other countries 
have been conducted with success.  
Hazafi also reckons as a further problem, that every reform resulted in the 
reduction of personnel and in most cases, it only amounted to it. Thus, the continuous 
downsizing led instead of cheaper public service to an increase of expenditures 
(Hazafi, 1995.). 
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8.1. The legislative background of performance management 
 
The implementation of the so-called Transparency Act may provide a new 
impetus to more efficient management of public funds and assets. By modifying 
certain regulations pertaining to budgetary organizations, this act wishes to achieve 
two main objectives: on the one hand, to curtail corruption in the public sector, on 
the other hand to eliminate the possibility of mismanagement of public funds and 
assets, and to achieve a more efficient and transparent use of taxpayers money. In 
this thesis, I only wish to deal with the latter objective.   
The basic idea of the Act is that in certain cases, publicity itself can replace 
market mechanisms. Legislators, when they decided to provide credible and 
understandable information to the citizens, aimed to strengthen public confidence, 
the commitment of the society towards democracy, and more consumer focused 
approach.  
Legislators tried to ascertain the most typical sources of losses in the public 
sector, and ordered the regular publication of data related to them. This information 
is accessible for everyone, because it has to be published in every quarter of a year 
on the website or in the official journal of the given ministry in a form that is easily 
understandable for the public. 
This data set primarily aims to reduce mismanagement, but only covers a 
fraction of the complete budget. A much more important, yet less developed area of 
this act is the measurement of the efficiency and effectiveness of budgetary 
organizations through the use of performance indicators. The Act wishes to grant the 
possibility to taxpayers to see what they receive for their taxes, and to see whether 
public funds and assets have been used in a cost efficient manner.  
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The government decree that has been published in conjunction with the 
implementation of this act makes it mandatory and leaves it to every portfolio to 
define the methodology and the indicators (capacity, task, performance, efficiency, 
effectiveness) that allow the performance measurement of the organizations using 
public assets and funds. 
The transparency of the use of public funds and public assets is not only 
provided through financial data, but also through the underlying performance, the 
efficiency of professional work, and related processes.  
The Act approaches performance measurement through the measurement of 
effectiveness as well, and orders the regular measurement of consumer satisfaction, 
since the objective of public policy decisions and the outcomes of the 
implementation, according to empirical studies, many times are not in harmony. 
Analysts have realized that it is not enough to justify political decisions, it is also 
important to study the result with which the bureaucracy performed a given task 
(Jenei, 1997.). 
The implementation of the Transparency Act is decentralized, the above-
mentioned data do not constitute a part of the budgetary report, the budgetary 
organizations publish it individually. Beside this, the new regulation also makes it 
possible to the citizens to ask for further information, but they need to cover the cost 
of generating information to answer their questions.  
The idea of decentralized implementation could be justified by the fact that in 
the public sector there is no method to compare performance, since e.g. completely 
different indicators will characterize the efficiency of the organizations in the defense 
sector or the health sector. The fact that in both cases we talk about budgetary 
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organizations does not mean that we should consider them identical in terms of 
substance, organization and operation.  
In my opinion, however the decentralized implementation is more the 
consequence of the complicated task, because there has not been any centralized 
effort to establish a methodology, despite the fact that it would be possible to define 
basic criteria and requirements vis-à-vis a system of performance measurement at 
central level, and the system could be tailored to the needs of the individual 
portfolios. There has not been a study of impacts ordered by the government either 
on the set of necessary conditions or the minimal human resource, organizational and 
technical requirements related to the implementation of the Act (Kovács, 2003a). 
It is already visible that the introduction of the system requires significant 
surplus resources on the short term, however on the long term has the advantage that 
it establishes a standard framework for reporting on professional activities and 
integrates it with the financial report. 
In terms of the objectives, savings are of utmost importance, since the impact 
of publicity is greater efficiency that can lead to savings of budgetary resources, thus, 
with their reallocation to other areas the role of the state and the reallocation of 
incomes can be reduced. 
8.2. Performance audit 
 
The efficient functioning of the performance management system supposes that 
external authorities scrutinize performance related information i.e. beside adherence 
to legal regulations, a performance audit is also required.  
The Ministry of Defense in this sense is an exception in Hungary, since the 
State Audit Office does not conduct a performance audit, nor does it any audit of the 
budgetary report that would certify the reality and reliability of the report. Based on 
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international experience and through pure logic, traditional audit should precede 
performance reviews, since this can certify the correct database required to establish 
performance indicators.  
Taking into account the size of defense portfolio and the capacity of the State 
Audit Office in terms of the number of personnel and other resources, it is 
questionable, whether the supervisory authority could be capable of auditing the 
budgetary report of the portfolio even if relevant security regulations, which 
currently prevent it from auditing, were lifted.  
The State Audit Office is primarily preparing to carry out the tasks for which 
the Transparency Act set a deadline. According to the new rules, the State Audit 
Office has the right to carry out audit at any organization using public funds, thus, its 
increased tasks in the near future will not allow performance audit avail over the 
simple scrutiny of adherence to regulations. 
According to Nyikos, when it comes to reporting on the use of public funds, 
one has to find an answer to the following questions: who needs to report, on what, 
and who is to be reported to (Nyikos, 2003.). In terms of finding an answer to these 
questions, the Transparency Act did result in some progress, however beside legal 
regulation, there is also a requirement for establishing a professional regulation to 
decide on the procedures and methods of reporting.  
In theory, the supervisory authority can study the expediency of public 
spending, but in the majority of cases questions there are no remarks on it in audit 
report. The difficulty to decide whether the public spending was expedient or not, 
lies in the fact, that the circumstances of the decision-making at the time when the 
decision was made are not documented as much as the final decision and its 
consequences. That is why it is difficult to prove later on in an objective way, that 
another decision would have resulted in better efficiency or effectiveness.  
According to Nyikos, the current situation is not satisfactory, since the 
Hungarian Auditing Standards in their foreword already emphasize that the use of 
the standards can only be introduced in the private sector, and do not refer to the 
budgetary sector. It identifies the fact as one of the main differences between the two 
auditing activities, that an auditor in the private sector does not conduct performance 
audit, because the market controls the efficiency of a business organization.  
However, there is no possibility to study the performance of the budgetary 
organizations according to such objective criteria that is why the Transparency Act 
places a higher emphasis on efficiency, rather than adherence to rules. According to 
Nyikos, International Standards regulating the audit of budgetary organizations 
should be tailored to Hungarian needs and introduced in the public sector (Nyikos, 
2003.). 
 
Area Private Sector Public Sector 
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International Level IFAC10 Standards 
 
INTOSAI11  
Standards 
National Level Standards of the Hungarian 
Chamber of Auditors 
(2001) 
 
? 
 The direction of adaptation and the intensity of influence  
Figure 8: National and international standards of auditing.  
Source: Nyikos [2003] p. 5. 
While Nyikos urges for a domestic tailoring of standards referring to the public 
sector (Figure 8), Bihary does not agree with this opinion. He argues, that there is no 
                                                 
10 International Federation of Accountants 
11 International Organization of Supreme Audit Institution 
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national character that would require the tailoring of these standards, thus, audits 
have to be executed on the basis of international standards, just as it is done by the 
auditors of the European Union and NATO (Bihary, 2003.). 
As we can see, the implementation still requires further thinking, since there 
have been task indicators in use in public administration before, but the aim is not 
that we generate indicators, rather it is to fill them with substance and to relate 
consequences to them. We also have to take into account that the cost of generating 
information should not exceed the benefits of using this information.  
As every assessment, the performance assessment is also relative, absolute 
numbers do not carry too much information, they need to be related to something. If 
the data of different organizations are not identical because they carry out different 
tasks, then there is a possibility of comparison in time, especially, if we have data 
pertaining to different time periods, or we can integrate professional and financial 
data in order for example to define the unit cost of outcomes (Budget, 2002.).  
In order to measure performance Reke used multivariable statistical methods. 
Indicators suitable for the measurement of input and output were defined and then 
using a sample of companies, the indicators were transformed into independent 
factors, in order to eliminate multicollinearity (Reke, 1995.). By selecting one or two 
indicators that were the most descriptive of a factor, it became possible to actually 
define a relatively small number of indicators, which measured the different 
dimensions of performance relatively well. Later on, there was also an attempt made 
to use cluster analysis to support management decision-making (Reke, 1997.).  
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9. The management of the Hungarian Defense Forces 
 
National defense is a public good, thus it has the characteristics of 
indivisibility, nobody can be excluded from assumption, zero marginal cost, the 
problem related to the availability of information and the presence of externalities. 
The theoretical background of efficient management of public goods is discussed in 
the public choice theory, however this thesis does not discuss it in detail. 
Certain authors do not look upon national defense as being a pure public good, 
because if an Armed Force has been deployed on a front, then it is not sure, that it 
would be able to defend from another attack coming from another direction, thus, 
people living in the latter area would not enjoy the same level of protection (Cullis-
Jones, 2003.). However, this logic disregards the fact that the defense forces by 
fending off the first attack protected every citizen of the country, and the second 
failure will also have overall impact on the whole population, although it will differ 
in time.  
Stiglitz looks upon national defense as a pure public good, and when 
discussing the problems of allocating defense resources it highlights that sometimes 
assets (the procurement of weapon systems) and objectives (the establishment of a 
defense capability) are confused, the total cost of defense is almost never revealed, 
and in many cases technology directs innovation, which means that certain assets are 
decommissioned, because something more advanced has appear on the market 
(Stiglitz, 2001.).  
The scope of public services depends on the development of a society and on 
political and economic decisions. Public service provides the same conditions for 
every member of the society, thus with the increase in the development of a country 
and the increase in the standards of living there is a decrease in the demand for 
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uniform services (Illés 2000.). Defense in this sense is an exception, there will 
always be a need for it and this need might even increase with the increase of 
development.  
9.1. The command system and the management of the 
Hungarian Defense Forces 
 
With the integration of the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Staff, the MoD 
besides its public administration tasks as a ministry is also responsible as a military 
organization for the command and organization of the Hungarian Defense Forces 
(HDF). The high-level supervision of the Hungarian Defense Forces is thus carried 
out by the MoD, the intermediate level executive organizations are the Land Forces 
Command, Air Force Command and the Joint Logistics and Support Command.  
Executive and professional control are separated in the MoD and the HDF. 
Heads of departments and directorates within the MoD, as functional managers are 
responsible for professional issues, they are professional supervisors of the HDF in 
issues pertaining into their scope of activity.  
The management of the Hungarian Defense Forces is primarily set forth by 
rules and regulations pertaining to every budgetary organizations, but any exceptions 
to the general rules are set forth in separate government decree that covers the 
management of public funds and public assets.  
The minister exercises his authority as an executive in certain issues through 
the commander (leader) of the defense organizations, and has the right to centralize 
certain responsibilities and obligations of the commander, and delegate them to 
designated defense organizations. 
Regulations related to the management of budgetary organizations detail the 
tasks that their financial organization has to perform. Defense organizations 
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characteristically do not have their own financial organization, the majority of such 
tasks are performed in a centralized way, and designated organizations specialized in 
each area provide those services as supplies in kind. 
The ministerial regulation setting out the detailed regulation on the 
management of funds by the defense organizations set forth that the management is 
mainly done centrally through central services and central supplies in kind, and the 
institutional level of management only has a secondary role.  
The planning, procurement and management of resources required by the 
defense organizations to perform their duties, and the planning, implementation, 
supervision of the budget is carried out by designated defense organizations.  
The following tasks are carried out centrally: 
- allocation of human resources for the whole HDF; 
- management of salaries except for civil servants; 
- development, investment, renovation, decommissioning, and scrapping of 
assets of military technology; 
- investment in real estate, construction, renovation; 
- housing; 
- management and sale of state assets; 
- insurance on personnel and assets; 
- execution of centrally managed procurement; 
- environmental protection, safety regulations and fire protection. 
The following are also managed centrally, but the budget provisions 
covering the expenses are approved in the budget of the defense organizations: 
- the calculation, settlement and payment of salaries to the personnel; 
- certain financial and accounting services for defense organizations that do not 
have a financial organization;  
- providing fixed assets, stocks, services, and information that is related to 
supplies in kind; 
- management of financial issues related to international relations; 
- management of import procurements.  
 100
The management of state assets is also carried out centrally, the rights and 
responsibilities of a trustee, such as the sale of assets do not belong to the 
commander of the defense organization. The commander has the right and the 
responsibility to manage the assets available for the defense organization, but has 
little influence on the quality and quantity of those assets. Even if an asset becomes 
unnecessary for the operation, the commander has to obtain the approval of the 
functional managers who are responsible for the portfolio level management of that 
asset, and after that the Chief of Defense Staff will certify for the trustee, that it is 
unnecessary for the operation of HDF. 
The salaries and the social security expenses attached to them, which amounts 
to approximately 40 percent of the defense budget, are calculated and settled 
centrally. Law regulates most of the components of the salaries, the amount depends 
on the rank, appointment etc., but not on the performance of the individual, 
consequently, the commander has almost no influence on them.  
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Figure 9: The composition of the defense budget 1998-2002. 
Source: Four years of defense 1998-2002. p. 206. 
The commander of a defense organization has limited influence on the 
selection and employment of personnel either, since employer rights are also 
centralized.  The promotion of military personnel, which is the precondition for the 
appointment to a higher position, is also determined by law, there is no possibility of 
promotion by merit or performance.  
The revenue side of the defense budget is also an exception compared to other 
portfolios, because after becoming a NATO member, the government undertook the 
commitment to appropriate a fixed percent of the GDP to national defense. It follows 
from this that the defense organizations receive public funds from the State Treasury 
to cover all of their approved budgetary expenditures, while other portfolios are 
expected to generate some revenues to cover a part of their expenditures. In return, 
defense organizations have to transfer their revenues to the State Treasury. 
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The reasons behind these special regulations stem from the special designation 
of defense and the fact that meeting the strategic objectives of the defense portfolio is 
impossible without overarching programs. Defense organizations are unable to 
defend the territory of Hungary without coordinating their individual efforts.  It is 
therefore necessary to unify the requirements vis-à-vis military assets, to guarantee 
interoperability, and the level of supplies should also be identical.  
9.2. The accounting system  
 
The financial part of the accounting system of the defense portfolio does not 
comprise any specialty compared with other budgetary organizations, except for the 
valuation of special military assets. 
The budgetary appropriations and the actual figures are recorded in the 
Financial and Accounting System of the MoD Budgetary Management Information 
System. As for public assets, the MoD does not have an on-line system with a unified 
database to keep track of the movements in assets, the individual defense 
organizations keep the records independently from each other, but using the same 
methods and the same software.    
The separation of financial and management accounting is somewhat different 
from the market sector, because in the public sector the budgetary organizations have 
to report on the number of personnel within the framework of financial accounting, 
and the budgetary report contains the actual expenditures and revenues, as well as 
their planned figures.  
There is no initiative in the public sector to establish a management accounting 
system, since the management of budgetary organizations is determined by rigid 
rules (Csepregi, 2002.), and managers cannot use the information gained from a 
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management accounting system, if the right decision based on accounting 
information would contradict those rules.  
Another obstacle for implementing a management accounting system, as it was 
mentioned in Chapter 4, is that the efficiency of an organization cannot be assessed 
on the basis of expenditure, but in the cash based accounting system the cost is not 
recorded. In the case of the MoD, even the allocation of expenditures would be 
cumbersome, because as a consequence of the central management of budgetary 
funds only a small proportion of the expenditures incurred in the interest of a defense 
organization is included in their budget.  
The simultaneous recording of budgetary appropriation and the actual revenues 
and expenditures should constitute the basis of a controlling system, but there are no 
fundamental deviations between the two, because of the financing system. As a 
general rule, budgetary organizations receive 1/12 of their annual budget per month, 
and they have to explain if the nature of the task requires an extraordinary financing 
schedule.  
9.3. The prospects of public sector reforms in defense 
 
Changes always bring about resistance in an organization, and as the size of the 
organization or its history grows, one should expect stronger resistance against 
implementing new ideas. This might be the reason that public administration reforms 
mostly appear when the old regime becomes impossible to finance (Pete, 1997.).  
In the recent years, the defense reviews have become permanent and the 
Hungarian Defense Forces have undergone some reforms that left untouched the 
management methods and procedures, merely ordered the merger of some defense 
organizations to decrease the amount of necessary real estate, and also resulted in 
some downsizing of human resources.  
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In many countries that face similar problems to Hungary, the reduction of 
personnel is inevitable to strike the balance between the size of the Armed Forces 
and the economic capacity of the country (Yermakov, 2001.). Nevertheless, this does 
not increase in itself the efficiency of the organization, and it is questionable if the 
best way to grasp the size of the Armed Forces is through the number of personnel.  
The current management system of the HDF is far from meeting the 
requirements of New Public Management, since the autonomy of the heads of 
defense organizations in professional or financial affairs is insignificant; 
consequently, accountability is reduced to adherence to rules and regulations.  
Anthony and Govidnarajan pointed out that a controlling system should be able 
to influence employees in order to implement organizational objectives. Because of 
the rigid rules and regulations pertaining to budget organizations, the opportunity to 
influence the staff is almost non-existent in defense. Financial incentives are very 
rare, since salaries and allowances are defined by law, while other incentives such as 
advancement in rank is also impossible to use, since the law sets forth the conditions 
for promotion (e.g. length of time in the previous rank, university degree etc.). 
The Defense Planning System, which is currently under implementation, shows 
the characteristics of the goal model described earlier. The military planners define 
the activities that should be carried out in order to meet the strategic goals, then the 
need for human resources and other resources are identified, and finally the 
budgetary planners estimate the budgetary consequences of the plan.  
The success of this planning system is questionable in the current management 
framework. The defense organizations, which hold the information about the 
activities carried out, are not aware of their total cost, since they have information on 
the expenditures that belong to the scope of institutional management. The main 
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portion of the defense budget is spent centrally, but the central suppliers cannot link 
the expenditures to tasks, since for example at the time of procurement, when the 
expenditure has to be registered in the books, it cannot be foreseen which 
organization will use the asset or the stock for which activity.  
The central management of the defense budget facilitates the enforcement of 
economy because of the larger amounts procured and organizations specialized in 
procurement can achieve savings through their expertise. The gains of the central 
management in economy are partly lost, because the central supplies in their current 
form hinder the allocation of costs, thus the enforcement of efficiency. 
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10. Empirical research 
 
  I am convinced, that the Hungarian public administration reform can only be 
successful if instead of selecting and ordering the implementation of certain elements 
of international reform programs, first we need to create the preconditions of the 
introduction of an overall reform.  
There was no feasibility study about the implementation of a performance 
measurement system, which was ordered for budgetary organizations. My 
hypotheses, filling this gap, study the possibilities of performance management 
within the current framework at one of the major players in the Hungarian public 
administration, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense.  
According to my hypotheses, the legislation currently in force is not in 
harmony with the requirements of performance measurement. After their 
verification, I wish to formulate some suggestions on how to assure the necessary 
conditions for performance measurement.  
10.1. The obstacles of measuring efficiency 
 
International literature considers the greater freedom of managers in decision-
making as a crucial precondition of performance measurement, which is 
accompanied by stricter accountability on performance. For the problems revealed by 
performance measurement, the managers can be held accountable if they had an 
opportunity to intervene. 
10.1.1. The contradiction of performance measurement and the 
regulation of salaries 
 
In the Hungarian practice, the rules and regulations pertaining to budgetary 
organizations set forth such detailed and rigid rules, that they make performance 
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measurement almost impossible. This rigidity could be proved in several areas, but 
this thesis will focus on the salaries and social security expenditures, which amounts 
to 40 percent of the defense budget.  
H1. Before holding the heads of defense organizations responsible for the 
efficient use of expenditures on personnel, changes are required in the 
regulations in force, because the heads of defense organizations currently have 
hardly any influence on those expenditures.  
The importance of this hypothesis is to demonstrate that more than one third of 
the defense budget is spent in a way, that no one can be held accountable on its 
efficient use.  
The amount of expenditures on personnel can be influenced in two ways: either 
by identifying the level of salaries, or by changing the number of personnel. The 
regulations on personnel expenditures in defense are obstacles in both ways, since 
salaries are roughly the same regardless of the performance of personnel, and on the 
other hand they do not facilitate economical management, since if the manager 
decides to decrease the number of personnel, he/she cannot dispose over the savings 
generated by this decision. 
H1.1. The major part of expenditures on personnel is determined by law, 
the payments allocated on the basis of a managerial decision are not significant.  
H1.2. If the head of a defense organization does not fill all the available 
positions, he cannot decide about the reallocation of these savings.  
The verification of hypothesis H1.1. is based on the expenditures of MoD in 
2003, and on the laws and regulations pertaining to the salaries of the personnel of 
the Hungarian Defense Forces. First, I identify the share of salaries and social 
security expenditures within the total expenditure of the portfolio. These data are 
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recorded in the Financial and Accounting System of the Budgetary Management 
Information System, according to which the salaries in 2003 amounted to 98967.7 
thousand Hungarian forints (HUF), while the social security expenditures were 
28897.6 thousand HUF, i.e. altogether 40.83% of the total budget. After this I 
identify the components of the salaries that do not depend on the decision of the 
manager, instead they are paid if certain conditions are met e.g. allowance on foreign 
languages if the employee has a language certificate. This would also identify the 
leeway of the managers, i.e. the amount not determined by laws. In order to make my 
comparative analysis more transparent, I prepared a table to compare the three 
relevant laws (see in Annex 3). 
For the verification, I analyze the laws pertaining to the salaries of military 
personnel, public servants and civil servants to identify the components that can be 
influenced by managerial decision-making. Before this analysis however I would like 
to observe that the salary of each individual is set forth by the order of the 
commander, this however does not mean that the manager has influence on the 
salaries, I assume that this order merely identifies the stipulations of the law that 
applies to the given individual. 
The Parliamentary resolution on the composition of defense personnel orders to 
reach the composition shown in Table 6 by 31 December 2006. As the table shows, 
public servants and civil servants altogether will constitute 17 percent of defense 
personnel. The current proportions are similar, so the analysis will mainly focus on 
the link between the salaries of military personnel and their performance.  
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Categories Number 
 Officers  7 500 
 Ensigns and NCOs   11 700 
 Enlisted ranks  13 350 
 University students  650 
 Public servants and civil servants  6 800 
 Total  40 000 
Table 6: The composition of the personnel of the Hungarian Defense Forces 
Source: Parliamentary resolution 15/2004. (III. 24.). 
All the three salary systems12 in review contain the same major elements: 1) 
basic salary, 2) salary supplement, 3) salary allowance, 4) miscellaneous allowances, 
5) miscellaneous supplements are due to military personnel, public servants and civil 
servants as well.  
I wish to identify the elements of the salary system, where the highest and the 
lowest value of the allowance does not depend on meeting an objective criteria such 
as holding a degree or being in a certain position for a certain period of time, but the 
amount is defined by the performance of the individual.  
1.) As for the basic salary, in the case of military personnel the head of the 
defense organization can increase it by 20 percent, whereas for public servants, the 
actual amount of the basic salary can be 20 percent higher or lower than it is 
determined in law, but the difference to the previous salary cannot be more than 20 
percent. The law pertaining to public servants links the difference directly to the 
performance of the individual, while the law on military personnel states that the 
difference can emerge on the basis of the judgment of the commander. A ministerial 
decree was issued to specify this rule, which gives this possibility to appreciate the 
                                                 
12 There are different laws for regulating the salaries of the military personnel, public servants and 
civil servants.   
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outstanding performance of the individual if the defense organization has funds in its 
budget to finance the higher cost, and it is possible only for a definite period of time.  
As for other civil servants, the basic salary cannot be altered, but if the 
individual permanently fulfills his/her duties with high standards, or in the case of 
outstanding performance the waiting period for the next payment category can be 
decreased by 1 year in each category.  
2.) The salary supplement is set forth by law, and neither of the laws give the 
opportunity to the head of the defense organization to digress from it.  
3.) The salary allowances do not depend on either performance or managerial 
decision. A military officer for example is entitled to receive salary allowance if his 
assignment is more dangerous than the average, it involves higher than average 
requirements or he/she has to tolerate unfavorable conditions, and those cannot be 
acknowledged in the basic salary. But the amount is due to the officer from the time 
of promotion to an assignment that qualifies for the allowance, and the performance 
or the evaluation of the commander has no influence on its sum. 
4.) Among the other allowances, some seem to depend on performance, but 
most of them are linked to the assignment or depend on the quantity of tasks 
delivered, not on the quality. They do not depend on the evaluation of the 
commander, hence they are not appropriate to express the satisfaction of the 
commander with the quality of work.  
Surveyor’s allowance is the only item that allows the commander decide on its 
sum considering the performance, the environment, the type of tasks and the quality 
of work. However, the share of this allowance is so low and it is due to so few 
employees, that I disregard it during this study.  
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5.) Among the other supplements, the bonus is the only item that provides an 
opportunity to acknowledge performance.  
As stated earlier, beyond the last two examples, other components of the salary 
depend to a certain extent on the duty fulfilled, but rather on the quantity than on the 
quality of it. In other words, all the three salary systems are basically based on 
assignments, not on performance, which is inappropriate to establish a performance 
management system.  
To sum up the analysis, we can conclude that the only component of the salary 
that can be influenced by the commander is the bonus, which amounted to the 2.27 
percent of expenditures on personnel.  
In the case of military personnel and public servants, there is also a possibility 
to depart from the amount set forth in law, but this option can be applied only if the 
defense organization has the necessary funds to cover the surplus expenditure. The 
Human Resource Management Information System of the MoD is currently not 
suitable to prepare a report that shows at portfolio level the financial consequences of 
that rule, i.e. the amount with which the actual salaries paid differ from the amount 
set forth in law.  
Because of the deficiencies in the information system, we can only estimate the 
amount of that deviation. Its maximum amount could be the 20 percent of the basic 
salaries, but the requirement that the defense organization has to be able to finance it 
further decrease the possible upper limit.   
First we need to calculate the proportion of the basic salary within the total 
expenditure on personnel, but the actual sum paid on basic salary already comprises 
the deviation we try to estimate. Taking into consideration that in the case of military 
personnel the actual basic salary can only be higher by 20 percent than as it is 
 112
specified in law, and only for the public servants, the number of which is quite 
smaller, that deviation is possible in both directions, we can assume that the actual 
basic salary is not lower than the basic salary set forth by law (without the deviation). 
It means, that if we use the actual basic salary to calculate the deviation, we most 
probably will overestimate the leeway of the commanders. 
The basic salary paid to military personnel and public servants constituted 58.9 
percent of the personnel expenditures, 20 percent of which amounts to 11.78 percent. 
Adding the proportion of the bonus to this figure, we can conclude that in 2003 the 
heads of defense organizations could not determine more than 14 percent of the 
personnel expenditures.  
H1.2. If the head of a defense organization does not fill all the available 
positions, he cannot decide about the reallocation of these savings.  
I conducted further analysis of the rules and regulations pertaining to defense 
organizations to substantiate hypothesis H1.2. Each defense organization has a table 
of organization and equipment, and the number of personnel set in it cannot be 
exceeded, but it is not obligatory to fill in all the positions.  
The system would meet the requirements of performance measurement even if 
the head of the defense organization could not influence the salary of the individuals, 
but he could reallocate the savings generated by leaving some of the assigned 
positions vacant.  
To verify this hypothesis I analyze the laws and regulations determining the 
management of budgetary organizations in general and defense organizations in 
particular. I collect the rules that specify the rights of the head of defense 
organization in amending the budget and using the savings on expenditures on 
personnel for other purposes.  
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As we could see in Chapter 4.4, the general rules pertaining to budgetary 
organizations provide a relatively high level of flexibility to reallocate the savings, 
and restrictions mainly extend to the use of savings on material expenditures for 
paying salaries, aiming to prevent the misuse of public funds.  
The situation is different in the case of defense organizations, since the 
payment of salaries fall under the scope of central management, except for the 
salaries paid to civil servants. The management of the salaries of civil servants is 
accomplished at the institutional level management. The head of the defense 
organization can decide about the reallocation of those savings according to the 
following rules: 
- the savings generated by the difference between the approved average salary 
and the actual salary can be spent on increasing basic salaries or salary allowances; 
- the savings due to the unpaid leave of the civil servants can be used for 
miscellaneous allowances and supplements. 
All in all, the reallocation of savings on expenditures on personnel in 2003 was 
only possible in the case of the 7892 civil servants, and those savings, since the rules 
for defense organizations are more rigid than the ones applied for budgetary 
organizations in general, could only be used for expenditures on personnel.  
In summary to support my position on hypothesis H1: 
I have found hypothesis H1.1 to be correct, because in 2003 not more than 14 
percent of the expenditures on personnel depended on the decision of the heads of 
defense organization, the rest was set forth by law.  
I have also found hypothesis H1.2 to be correct, because the heads of defense 
organizations can only dispose over the salaries of civil servants. This constituted 4.9 
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percent of the total expenditures on personnel, and the savings on those items could 
not be used for other purposes than payments on personnel.  
As a consequence of this, if the MoD wants to hold the heads of defense 
organizations accountable for the efficient use of personnel expenditures, then rules 
and regulations should be revised both at governmental level and within the MoD.  
10.1.2. The centralization of management 
 
International literature does not conclude the discussion on performance 
measurement with measuring inputs, outputs and outcomes, but it examines the 
relation between them, especially efficiency and effectiveness.  
One of the obstacles to performance measurement in the Hungarian Defense 
Forces is the lack of a system that is suitable to measure output. This obstacle can be 
surmounted relatively easily, since there is no legal restriction that would prevent the 
HDF from doing so, it can develop a system measuring the outputs at its discretion, 
but so far, the will has been missing. 
 However, measuring the outputs would not solve all the problems, since the 
current information system is unable to measure inputs in a way that is suitable for 
calculating the unit costs of outputs, thus, the system does not support performance 
management. The accounting system of the HDF could be reshaped in order to make 
the allocation of expenditures by outputs possible, but as we could see during the 
discussion on the differences between cash based and accruals accounting, the 
allocations of cost is only possible after the transition to accruals accounting.  
The attempt of the transition to accruals accounting in the 1970s was 
unsuccessful in Hungary, because the employees operating the system had to prepare 
reports in both approaches, and they could not see the benefits of the system, since 
the management in fact did not use the information generated by the new system, 
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they could only see the disadvantage of it because it doubled the work load. We can 
draw the conclusion from this attempt, that the HDF should not introduce the 
accruals accounting and operate it parallel with the cash based system of public 
finances, the transition is only possible at governmental level. 
In the current situation, expenditures can only be allocated on inputs, on which 
the heads of the defense organizations do not always have influence, as we could see 
it by verifying hypothesis H1. With the following hypothesis, I wish to shed light on 
a further problem, since the heads of defense organization beside not having 
influence do not have information about the price of resources used for their 
activities either. 
H2. Before introducing the measurement of efficiency, the information 
system of central management should be reshaped, because in its current form 
it does not provide full-scale information for the heads of defense organization 
about the expenditures incurred in the interest of their activity.  
 I also verify this hypothesis in two steps; first I determine the scope of central 
management within the management of HDF. The majority of public funds are used 
centrally, and those expenditures are not approved in the budget of the end user 
defense organizations, but in the budget of central suppliers. This in itself would not 
create a problem for measuring efficiency, if the heads of defense organizations 
would receive information about the incurred expenditures when receiving the 
supply in kind. In the second phase I prove, that the central suppliers currently do not 
provide this information.  
To calculate the efficiency indicators, one needs the information on outputs and 
on the expenditures incurred in order to produce the outputs. In the current system 
the information on output is available at the level of defense organizations, just as the 
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quantity of inputs used for the production of one unit of the output. The information 
on the price of those inputs, i.e. the expenditures incurred is only available at the 
central supplier.  
I suggest, that the efficiency indicators should be calculated at the level of 
defense organizations, not only because they have more of the relevant information 
about the activity, but because receiving information on expenditures would improve 
the cost consciousness of the heads of defense organizations.  
H2.1. The vast majority of the defense budget is spent within the system of 
central management.  
The structure of defense budget is detailed in Table 7.  
 
1/1. Ministry of Defense 3/2. Military Security Agency 
1/2. MoD Agencies 4. Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University 
1/3. MoD Background organizations 5. Military prosecutors 
2/1. General Staff and its subordinates 6. Military hospitals 
2/2. Land Forces 7. Governmental Bureau of Frequency Management 
2/3. Air Force and air defense  8/1. Estimates managed at MoD level – Investments 
3/1. Military Intelligence Agency 
8/2. Estimates managed at MoD level –  
Central programs 
Table 7: The structure of the defense budget 
Source: Act 62 of 2002 on the Budget of the Republic of Hungary for 2003.  
 
To prove hypothesis H2.1 I analyze the budgetary expenditures of the MoD 
Chapter for 2003, which is shown by titles and economic categories in Annex 4. First 
I calculate the proportion of each spending category within the total budget of the 
budgetary title (see in Table 8). 
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Title/ 
subtitle 
1. Salaries & 
social 
security 
2. Material & 
other 
expenditures
3. Operational 
budget  
(1+2) 
4. Capital 
budget 
1/1 66.10% 13.82% 79.92% 20.08%
1/2 63.99% 33.15% 97.13% 2.87%
1/3 15.63% 62.36% 77.98% 22.02%
2/1 28.59% 45.40% 73.99% 26.01%
2/2 88.96% 10.91% 99.87% 0.13%
2/3 77.84% 22.07% 99.91% 0.09%
3/1 65.31% 28.21% 93.52% 6.48%
3/2 87.11% 9.51% 96.62% 3.38%
4 71.44% 22.23% 93.66% 6.34%
5 89.76% 10.24% 100.00% 0.00%
6 64.41% 35.20% 99.61% 0.39%
7 74.63% 20.28% 94.92% 5.08%
Total 46.42% 37.80% 84.22% 15.78%
Table 8: The distribution of expenditures within the budgets of the MoD titles/subtitles  
 
The share of the operational budget is over 90 percent for the majority of the 
budgetary titles (except for 1/1, 1/3 and 2/1), which suggests a strong centralization 
of capital budget. As for the expenditures on salaries and social security, except for 
subtitle 1/3 and 2/1, where its proportion is under 30 percent, its share is between 64-
90 percent. As we saw during the verification of hypothesis H1, the head of defense 
organization has no real influence on this spending category, which constitutes more 
than two thirds of the institutional budgets.  
In the following step I identified the share of each title within the total budget 
of the defense portfolio (see in Table 9). 
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Title/ 
subtitle 
Number 
of 
personnel 
1. Salaries  
& social 
security 
2. Material 
& other 
expenditures
3. Operational 
budget  
4. Capital 
budget 
5. Total 
expenditures 
1/1 2.24% 5.80% 1.22% 3.52% 4.55% 3.58%
1/2 1.17% 2.42% 1.27% 1.85% 0.28% 1.55%
1/3 3.75% 6.30% 25.37% 15.79% 22.94% 16.45%
2/1 26.95% 24.23% 38.86% 31.51% 57.02% 34.61%
2/2 33.58% 26.03% 3.22% 14.68% 0.10% 11.95%
2/3 18.97% 16.10% 4.61% 10.38% 0.05% 8.45%
3/1 2.88% 6.50% 2.83% 4.67% 1.67% 4.06%
3/2 0.77% 1.86% 0.21% 1.04% 0.19% 0.87%
4 4.09% 4.35% 1.37% 2.87% 1.00% 2.49%
5 0.40% 0.57% 0.07% 0.32% 0.00% 0.26%
6 5.12% 5.69% 3.14% 4.42% 0.09% 3.61%
7 0.08% 0.15% 0.04% 0.10% 0.03% 0.08%
Subtotal 100.00% 100.00% 82.21% 91.15% 87.91% 87.96%
8/1      2.94%
8/2   17.79% 8.85% 12.09% 9.10%
Total 
  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 9: The distribution of the defense budget among budgetary titles/subtitles  
 
The relation between the number of personnel and the expenditures on personnel would be 
an interesting subject for analysis. As Table 9 shows, the number of personnel working for Land 
Forces or the Air Force together amounts to 52.55 percent of the total number of defense 
personnel, in other words approximately half of the employees are involved in administrative and 
supporting tasks. The share of the Land Forces and the Air Force within expenditures on 
personnel, on the contrary is only 42.13 percent, while the MoD, the agencies and background 
organizations of the MoD, the Military Intelligence Agency, the Military Security Agency and the 
Governmental Bureau of Frequency Management have double share within expenditures on 
personnel than within the number of personnel. 
Subtitles 1/3 and 2/1 spent 64.23 percent of the material expenditures, most of 
which belongs to the scope of central management. By adding the 17.79 percent of 
the material expenditures managed at MoD level, at first sight we can estimate the 
centralization of material expenditures to be at 82 percent. As for the capital budget, 
subtitles 1/3 and 2/1 dispose over the 80 percent of the total capital budget, while 12 
percent of the capital budget is managed at MoD level. 
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To obtain a more precise figure, I analyzed the budgetary report of the MoD 
for 2003, which specifies the sum spent within the system of central management 
(see in Table 10). 
Title/ 
subtitle 
1. Total 
expenditure 2. Salaries 
3.  Social 
security  
4. Other 
central 
expenditure
5. Institutional  
expenditure  
(1-2-3-4) 
1/1 11 210.6 5 659.9 1 750.2 2 435.0 1 365.5 
1/2 4 844.3 2 405.6 694.1 1 196.7 547.9 
1/3 51 517.5 6 369.2 1 682.4 40 684.3 2 781.6 
2/1 108 387.3 24 069.3 6 917.2 72 253.6 5 147.2 
2/2 37 417.1 25 863.5 7 422.5 0 4 131.1 
2/3 26 448.0 15 777.7 4 808.4 0 5 861.9 
3/1 12 717.4 6 463.4 1 842.9 0 4 411.1 
3/2 2 733.2 1 818.4 562.4 0 352.4 
4 7 788.4 4 326.9 1 237.0 0 2 224.5 
5 806.9 552.4 171.9 0 82.6 
6 11 297.4 5 513.0 1 763.1 0 4 021.3 
7 259.8 148.4 45.5 0 65.9 
Total 275 427.9 98 967.7 28 897.6 116 569.6 30 993.0 
Table 10: Central and institutional expenditures 
 
The first column of Table 10 contains the total expenditure of each title. For 
the specification of institutional expenditures, we deduct central expenditures from 
total expenditures. Based on the verification of hypothesis H1, I consider the 
expenditures on salaries and social security as central expenditure, since the head of 
defense organization has virtually no influence on them.  
The MoD Budgetary Management Information System applies different codes 
for central and institutional expenditures, but beyond those, I include the 
expenditures of some central tasks among central expenditures, if they were executed 
on behalf of other defense organizations. For example, the ministerial order on 
budgetary planning assigns the task of decreasing the environmental damages on 
polluted territories to the Department of Infrastructure, just as the renovation of 
military hospital, military barracks etc.  
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Table 10 has zero value in the central expenditure column for subtitle 2/2 and 
below. The reason behind it is that they do not provide inputs to other defense 
organizations13, but they are responsible for delivering some central tasks such as 
military education, health care etc.  
The last column of Table 10 shows the institutional expenditures, i.e. the 
expenditures over which the head of defense organization can dispose. Disregarding 
the budgetary estimates managed at MoD level, the institutional budget is 11.25 
percent of the total budget of titles 1-7. If the comparison extends to the total defense 
budget, the ratio decreases to 9.9 percent.  
We can go further in obtaining a more precise ratio of centralization, if we take 
into account what was stated during the verification of hypothesis H1. We can 
correct our figure if we separate the expenditures on salaries (40.83 percent of the 
total budget) for expenditures over which the head of defense organization can 
dispose (bonus, salaries of civil servants and the deviation of basic salaries of 
military personnel and public servants from the amount set forth by law), and the 
centrally managed funds. This would decrease the ratio of centralization by 7.9 
percent (to 82.2 percent from 90.1 percent). 
H2.2. The central suppliers do not provide full-scale information on the 
prices of supplies in kind to the defense organizations.  
To verify the hypothesis H2.2 I study the rules and regulations pertaining to the 
operation of central suppliers whether they order to provide information on the price 
of central supplies in kind. To collect the applicable rules and regulations I contacted 
the central supplier organizations in a letter. The rate of response was 100 percent, 
 
13 As it is shown in Annex 1 for the MoD UK, the expenditures of for example the Zrínyi Miklós 
National Defense University could be allocated to defense organizations if we calculated the cost of 
education per person and used the number of students delegated by a certain organization to allocate 
the expenditures, but the Hungarian reality is quite far from that.  
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since I work for the organization that is responsible for coordinating the formulation 
of a performance measurement system, so I asked for the information officially, and 
only my secondary objective was to use it for research purposes.  
I will include in institutional expenditures the centrally managed funds about 
which the central suppliers provide information. To qualify for the central 
expenditures category each item should meet two requirements: it is spent by the 
central supplier on behalf of other defense organizations and the central supplier does 
not provide information on expenditures to the defense organization.  
In this way it can be seen what percentage of the total defense budget depend 
on the heads of those defense organizations that are not central suppliers. The 
importance of this lies in the fact that the head of a central supplier organization can 
be held accountable only on economy, but not on the efficient use of supplies in kind. 
As for subtitle 1/1, among the central expenditures we can find funds for 
supporting sport clubs, prevention of nuclear accidents, renovation of military 
hospitals etc. Some of these items could be allocated to the end user organizations 
e.g. the renovation of military hospitals to title 6, but currently there is no rule for 
providing information on these central expenditures.  
The budget of subtitle 1/2 consists of such central items as insurance on 
personnel and on assets, the payment for the Hungarian Railways for providing 
special tariffs on trains for military personnel, the medical examination of conscripts, 
training abroad, the cost of new service ID cards etc. We can also say, that items 
related to personnel could be easily allocated to defense organizations on behalf of 
which the money was spent, but there is no rule for providing information to other 
defense organizations. 
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The main central expenditure of subtitle 1/3 is the infrastructural budget (the 
central procurement of maintenance services, central reconstruction of barracks, 
renovations etc.). The vast majority of buildings, installations etc. belonging to the 
defense portfolio are maintained and operated by a business enterprise, according to 
a contract which sets the price by defense organizations, but there is no rule on 
providing this information to them. 
As for subtitle 2/1, it disposes over the highest amount of central expenditures, 
because the Joint Logistic and Support Command plans and manages the logistic 
budget of HDF. Different rules apply to the fixed assets procured from this budget 
and to the stocks. Since the fixed assets are registered individually, the central 
supplier has to hand over and identification sheet to the defense organization, which 
among other things records the price of the asset. This means that the central 
suppliers provide information on assets delivered, but the defense organizations have 
no information system to collect, summarize or analyze this information. In other 
words, the price data on assets is available, but it is not used for decision-making. In 
the case of stocks, there is no regulation to provide information on their price.  
In summary to support my position on hypothesis H2: 
I have found hypothesis H2.1 to be correct, because more than 80 percent of 
the defense budget is managed centrally. 
Finding also support hypothesis H2.1, because only the central suppliers 
belonging to the Joint Logistic and Support Command provide information to 
defense organizations about centrally managed expenditures, but only on the price of 
fixed assets. In addition to that, defense organizations do not have an information 
system in place to analyze or use this information in decision-making.  
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Through the verification of hypothesis H2 we can see that the introduction of 
an output measurement system is insufficient to solve the problem of measuring 
efficiency, changes are indispensable in the management system to harmonize the 
system of measuring expenditures on input with the requirements of performance 
measurement.  
10.2. The obstacles of measuring effectiveness 
 
International experience shows that in the countries where the regulations and 
administrative rules in force do not make the measurement of efficiency possible, 
they use public surveys to measure effectiveness.  
In my opinion, this is not an appropriate way of measuring the effectiveness of 
the defense portfolio, because the citizens do not have an insight into the activities of 
defense organizations. In the case of some public services such as education or health 
care it might be satisfactory to measure the public opinion, since the majority of the 
citizens or a member of their family has first hand experience about those services. 
Some authors doubt the adequacy of this method even in the case of the latter public 
services, because the public cannot judge the professional quality of the service, only 
some less important factors such as the time of waiting, the atmosphere, the 
attentiveness of personnel etc.  
Hungary switched from the system of conscription to the establishment of 
professional Defense Forces. In the system of conscription, many citizens had 
experience about the performance of defense, but it cannot be the basis for the annual 
measurement of effectiveness, since those experiences date back many years.  
In the case of professional Defense Forces, the number of citizens who have 
experience in defense is insignificant, that is why I assume that the public opinion is 
not based on experience, it is rather determined by the media.  
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H3. The public opinion about defense is influenced by the information 
received from the media, therefore public surveys are inappropriate to measure 
the effectiveness of defense organizations. 
I will also prove this hypothesis in two steps; first I identify the ratio of those 
who have first hand experience on defense, i.e. citizens in the family of whom there 
is a professional, a contracted or a conscripted soldier. After this I determine and 
analyze the significant differences in the opinion of people with defense experience 
and all the rest.  
I consider it important to examine this question, because I believe that an 
unfavorable result of public survey would not necessarily cause any changes in the 
operation of defense organizations, the public opinion could be influenced by a better 
media strategy.  
To verify this hypothesis I conduct the analysis of a public survey ordered by 
the MoD. I had the database of this survey and the survey questionnaire (the studied 
questions of the survey are enclosed in Annex 5).  
The survey was conducted between 21 November and 4 December 2003, the 
pollsters asked the citizens above the age of 18 in Budapest and in 121 other 
settlements. The 1000 citizens were chosen by random sampling while the 
settlements by layered random sampling. The sample represents the Hungarian 
population by age, sex and type of settlement.  
The questionnaire touched upon several topics, but the questions analyzed in 
this thesis are: B1.4, BZ2.2, H2, F2, N7, N12, P5, P6, M1, A0, A1, A2, A3. These 
questions provide information besides demographic details on the source of defense 
related information and on the view on defense. 
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H3.1. The majority of the Hungarian population does not have first hand 
experience (by themselves or through a family member or a relative) on defense.  
To verify hypothesis H3.1, I analyzed the answers to question A.0, which 
measures if soldiers can be found in the family or among the friends of the 
individual. Thus we wish to count those individuals in the sample in the family or 
among the relatives of which there are professional, contracted or conscripted 
soldiers at the time of the survey.  
I used the SPSS software to analyze the large database and the criteria for 
filtering was that the value of variable a01 or a02 or a03 or a04 should be 3 or higher 
than 3. The software selected 132 individuals of the 1000 for which the criteria was 
true, which means that in the families or among the relatives of about 13 percent of 
our sample we can find a soldier.  
Considering that the sample was representative of the Hungarian population, 
we can accept hypothesis H3.1, since the vast majority (87 %) of the population does 
not have first hand experience about the operation of the Hungarian Defense Forces.  
H3.2. The opinion of those, who have first hand experience about the 
operation of HDF is significantly different from the opinion of those who collect 
information from the media. 
 To verify hypothesis H3.2, I refined the analysis and to separate those 
individuals who form their opinion on the basis of experience and those who rely 
merely on media I set two requirements: they have to have soldiers in their family or 
among their relatives (a01≥ 3 or a02≥ 3 or a03≥ 3 or a04≥ 3), and they have to 
collect information about the Hungarian Defense Forces mostly personally or from 
relatives (m1.6=1 or m1.7=1). Only 48 individuals of 1000 fell into this category.  
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The software created a filter variable to separate the two groups. During the 
verification of this hypothesis we study whether the answers of the members of the 
two groups are different enough to declare that the source of information (experience 
in HDF or media) influence the opinion formed about the HDF. It means that we run 
a one-way analysis of variances (ANOVA) between each studied question of the 
questionnaire and the filter variable. This thesis does not aim to explore all the 
variables that have influence on the public opinion about the HDF, the sole purpose 
is to reveal the correlation between the source of information and the opinion.  
To decide whether the answers are “different enough” the ANOVA method 
uses the sum of squares, which is divided into deviation between groups and within 
groups. The sum of squares within group expresses the heterogeneity within the 
group, i.e. how different the members of the group are compared to the group mean. 
The group means are also different from the mean describing the entire sample, 
which determines the sum of squares between groups. If we divide the sum of 
squares between groups and the total sum of squares, we can see how well our model 
explains the heterogeneity of the sample (Babbie, 2000.) 
The SPSS uses the F test, i.e. it compares the variances (the sum of 
squares/degree of freedom), to decide whether the group means are different enough 
to assume the correlation (Székelyi-Barna, 2002.).  
For each ANOVA my hypothesis H0 is that the two variables are independent, 
i.e. the opinion does not depend on the source of information. I wish to set it at 5 % 
level of significance, thus I declare my hypothesis of independence to be correct if 
the Sig. column of the ANOVA table (see in Annex 6) contains a value of over 0,05. 
In every other case we can be 95 percent sure that the answer to the given question 
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was influenced by the source of information. Those questions are B1.4, BZ2.2, H2, 
N12, P6.1.  
If we analyze the group means of the above-mentioned questions we can see 
that those who have experience trust the HDF more, support the transition to 
professional forces, support the increase of defense budget, and think of the HDF as 
an important national institution the officers of which are well trained, but its 
armament and military technology is in the need for development.  
From these results, we can draw a conclusion about the success of the media 
strategy of the MoD. For example the support of developing the armament of the 
HDF within the group that has first hand experience shows that they have a more 
pessimistic (and unfortunately most probably more realistic) picture of the HDF, 
that’s why they would increase the spending on this area. We could frame it that the 
media was successful in covering the problematic areas of defense, whereas this 
“success” involves the decrease of public support for increasing the defense budget.  
In summary to support my position on hypothesis H3: 
I have found hypothesis H3.1 to be correct, because the 87 percent of the 
Hungarian population does not have first hand experience about the operation of the 
Hungarian Defense Forces.  
During the verification of hypothesis H3.2. it became clear in the majority of 
cases that the source of information resulted in a difference in opinion, but on the 
other hand there were questions where this influence could not be revealed. Despite 
this we can accept the statement that in most cases (for more than half of the 
questions) the media distorts the judgment of effectiveness, thus the public survey is 
not an appropriate way of the annual measurement of organizational effectiveness. 
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The HDF have no comprehensive performance evaluation, which of course 
does not mean that the defense organizations operate without any external control on 
performance. It only means that there is no uniform methodology for evaluation and 
there are no comprehensive reports on performance.  
In the case of units assigned to NATO, there are uniform performance 
measurements – Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) for the Land Forces and Tactical 
Evaluation (TACEVAL) for the Air Forces. During these evaluations, they check 
whether a battalion can deploy to the theatre of operation within its reaction time and 
defend itself until the battle starts.  
In my opinion this evaluation methodology could be extended to the units that 
will not participate in any allied operations, and it could be developed further to 
measure the capabilities of the units to win a battle, not only to deploy to the theatre 
of operation.  
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 11. Summary 
 
The subject of this thesis came to the center of interest in the past few years 
both in the international and the national arena. The increased attention of taxpayers 
vis-à-vis public finances and the shrinking amount of budgetary resources triggered 
the changes in attitudes, and besides the legal use of public funds new requirements 
emerged to assure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. 
The Hungarian regulations pertaining to budgetary organizations were 
supplemented with the new requirement of performance measurement, but there was 
no analysis conducted to identify whether the current framework of budgetary 
management makes it possible to meet the new requirements. My thesis aimed to fill 
this gap and after discussing relevant international literature and the experiences of 
countries leading in public sector reform, I studied the existence of necessary 
conditions of performance measurement at one of the major players of the Hungarian 
public administration, the Hungarian Defense Forces. 
I pointed out, that the Hungarian regulations literally were just supplemented 
with the requirement of performance measurement, thus a new rule appeared in the 
input based management system, which requires an output focused management.  
With the verification of hypothesis H1. I shed light on the contradiction of the 
regulations pertaining to expenditures on personnel and the requirement of 
performance management. Namely, the heads of defense organizations cannot be 
held accountable on the efficient use of expenditures on personnel, because they have 
virtually no influence on it.  
Hypothesis H2 aimed to demonstrate that the necessary conditions for 
measuring the efficiency of defense organizations are currently missing in the HDF. 
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There is no system in place to measure the outputs, while the system of recording the 
use of inputs is inappropriate to provide information for performance measurement 
purposes.  
Hypothesis H3 turned to the study of the relation between organizational 
effectiveness and the conclusions that can be drawn from public surveys. I used the 
method of analysis of variances to show that even in the case of conscription Defense 
Forces the media has considerable influence on public opinion. Public surveys 
cannot be appropriate and exclusive methods to measure the effectiveness of defense 
organizations annually, because with the transition to all voluntary Defense Forces, 
the number of citizens who have first hand experience about the operation of HDF is 
decreasing, hence the influence of the media increases. 
My hypotheses focused on the crucial conditions of performance measurement, 
but the calculation of efficiency indicators in itself would not bring any 
improvements in management. In other word, the implementation of performance 
measurement is not enough, performance management is required, where the 
undesirable value of efficiency indicators has its consequences both at individual and 
at organizational level.  
In summary, the conditions for performance measurement in public 
administration are missing, and it is needless to create them until the management 
system remains the same, and no consequences are attached to performance 
indicators. The changes in public sector management are inevitable, and a 
comprehensive reform program should cover the following areas: 
- strategic approach in management; 
- loosening of administrative regulations; 
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- accountability of managers on performance and harmonized rules of 
employment; 
- performance measurement and performance audit; 
- transition to accruals accounting. 
With a comprehensive public administration reform the performance 
measurement would not be the end in itself, but with the consequences attached to 
the indicators would facilitate the better management of public funds and public 
assets. 
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 Annex 1: The Departmental Financial Management System in the UK 
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Annex 2: The Strategy Map of the Ministry of Defense in the UK 
 
  
 
 
Output 
Deliverables 
Perspective 
 
Resource 
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Perspective 
 
Enabling 
Processes 
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Future Perspective 
 
Investing in 
People 
Technology and 
Equipment 
Modernising 
Infrasturcture 
Training Acquisition Management 
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Defense 
Infrastructure 
Annual 
Budget
Operational 
Success Military  
Effectiveness 
Defense 
policy 
Better Use of Resources Improved Operational 
Effectiveness Battle Winning Defense Capability 
Source: Hally, 2004.  
 Annex 3: The comparison of public sector salary system  
Salary component Military personnel Public servants  Civil servants 
Basic salary Based on assignment and rank Based on assignment classes Based on payment classes 
Possibility of 
exception 
On the basis of the „judgment” of the 
commander +20%  
„Based on performance evaluation” the 
head of organization can decide +/– 20% 
(change to the previous max. 20%).  
Not possible, but in the case of 
outstanding performance the waiting 
period for the next payment class can 
be decreased by 1 year in each 
category 
Salary supplement 10-50% depending on the position of the 
organization in the hierarchy and on the 
level of education.  
10-80% depending on the organization 
and on education.   
Payable on the basis of law or a 
contract with the employee.  
Salary allowances:  
1. Allowance for 
managers 
5-50% depending on the assignment 10-65% depending on management level 100-300 % depending on 
management level 
2. Allowance on 
foreign languages 
10-100% depending on the language and 
the level of certificate max. 200% 
15-100% depending on the language and 
the level of certificate 
50-100% depending on the level of 
certificate 
3. Allowance on 
higher education 
The minister can give it for doctoral title 
or for special training  
30-75% determined by the head of 
organization for doctoral title or special 
training. The assignments qualifying for 
it should be defined.  
5-10% if the education of the 
employee exceeds the necessary level 
and uses it for the job in min. 10% of 
the working time  
Miscellaneous 
allowances 
Allowance in health hazardous 
assignments 45% 
Allowance in health hazardous 
assignments 45% 
Allowance in health hazardous 
assignments and for the permanent 
use of protective equipment 100% 
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Drivers allowance 13% Drivers allowance 13% 
0,5 and 1% per hour in the afternoon and 
at night in military hospitals 
Night allowance per hour 0,14% 
Allowance for pilots – 360-2500% 
depending on how experienced the pilot is 
and how complicated the tasks were 
Allowance for test pilots: 23-31%/ aircraft
Allowance for parachutists: 4,2-34% 
depending on the number and difficulty of 
jumps   
Allowance for parachute testing 23-31% 
depending on type 
Allowance for ordnance disposal experts: 
2,9-9,2% per hour 
Divers allowance 2,6-3,5% per hour 
Allowance for readiness 6,3% per day 
Allowance for duty: 3,8-7,4% per duty 
Allowance for exercise 7,4% per day 
Allowance for duty for doctors 0,45-4,5% 
per hour 
 
The minister can establish other 
allowances based on the special 
characteristics of the profession. If the 
law does not set forth the highest and 
the lowest value of allowance, the 
amount of allowance can be 
increased.  
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Allowance for surveyors 4,2-8,4% per 
day 
Allowance on flying experience 6,3-
37,5% per month 
Allowance for senior pilots 11,3-16,5% 
per month 
Allowance for ground support of aircrafts 
20% per month 
Allowance on special employment 50-
100% 
Allowance for instructors: 26-260% 
depending on experience  
Sanitary allowance 15-80% 
Bonus on service time  Bonus on service time Bonus on service time 
Recognition for permanently fulfilling the 
duties with high standards, or in the case 
of outstanding performance (gift, bonus, 
holiday, souvenir, medal, decoration) 
Recognition for permanently fulfilling 
the duties with high standards, or in the 
case of outstanding performance (gift, 
bonus, holiday, souvenir) 
Supplement per months can be paid 
for meeting a predefined performance 
standard or encouraging temporary 
fulfillment of extra duty 
Other benefits 14
Bonus for the permanent and effective 
accomplishment of duties. Not higher 
than the 6 months salary of the individual. 
Supplement for life and pension 
insurance  
Bonus for permanently outstanding 
performance  
                                                 
14 Int he case of public servants the amount of the benefits and the conditions for paying it, except for the recreation support, are set forth by the head of the organization. 
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Supplies in kind (arms, equipment, 
uniform, catering) 
The higher from work clothes or the 
200% of reimbursement on clothes 
Work clothes, uniforms 
Meal supplement  Meal supplement 
Public transport supplement Public transport supplement 
Housing supplement Supplement for housing, building or 
buying a flat or a house 
Rental fee supplement Rental fee supplement 
Recreation support (to family members, 
too) 
Recreation support 75-100% 
Aid for newly weds Aid for newly weds 
Social aid Social aid 
Scholarship, support of education Scholarship, support of education and 
language learning 
 
 
One month salary is due to everyone who is employed on 1 January. 
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Annex 4: The expenditures of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense in 2003  
In Million HUF 
Title/Subtitle Personnel(person) 1. Salaries 
2. Social 
security 
3. Material 
expenses 4. Other 
5. Operational 
budget 
(1+2+3+4) 
6. Capital 
budget 
7. Total  
Expenses 
(5+6) 
1/1. Ministry of Defense 930 5 659,9 1 750,2 1 406,9 142,8 8 959,8 2 250,8 11 210,6 
1/2. MoD Agencies 484 2 405,6 694,1 1 254,2 351,5 4 705,4 138,9 4 844,3 
1/3. MoD Background organizations 1559 6 369,2 1 682,4 31 958,5 165,3 40 175,4 11 342,1 51 517,5 
2/1. General Staff and its subordinates 11193 24 069,3 6 917,2 48 990,9 219,3 80 196,7 28 190,6 108 387,3 
2/2. Land Forces 13943 25 863,5 7 422,5 3 916,9 164,7 37 367,6 49,5 37 417,1 
2/3. Air Force and air defense 7877 15 777,7 4 808,4 5 721,4 116,2 26 423,7 24,3 26 448,0 
3/1. Military Intelligence Agency 1196 6 463,4 1 842,9 3 564,7 22,8 11 893,8 823,6 12 717,4 
3/2. Military Security Agency 321 1 818,4 562,4 252,9 7,1 2 640,8 92,4 2 733,2 
4. Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University 1699 4 326,9 1 237,0 1 717,1 13,9 7 294,9 493,5 7 788,4 
5. Military prosecutors 167 552,4 171,9 79,8 2,8 806,9 0,0 806,9 
6. Military hospitals 2125 5 513,0 1 763,1 3 942,3 34,8 11 253,2 44,2 11 297,4 
7. Governmental Bureau of Frequency 
Management  32 148,4 45,5 52,2 0,5 246,6 13,2 259,8 
Total 41526 98 967,7 28 897,6 102 857,8 1 241,7 231 964,8 43 463,1 275 427,9 
8/1. Estimates managed at MoD level – 
Investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200,09  
8/2. Estimates managed at MoD level – 
Central programs 0 0 0 3,0 22 529,2 22 532,2 5 977,3 28 509,5 
MoD Total 41526 98 967,7 28 897,6 102 860,8 23 770,9 254 497,0 49 440,4 313 137,4 
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Annex 5: Survey questionnaire  
 
 
Public Survey on the Hungarian Defense Forces 
November 2003.  
 
The survey is conducted by Echo Survey Sociological Research Center on behalf of MoD 
Zrínyi Communication Kht. The sample consists of the random sample of Hungarian 
citizens above the age of 18. The data is classified and response is voluntary! 
 
KEY   1 2 3 4 5 6          2 
 
 
 
 
2003. Month:                             Day:                          Hour:  
 
 
Pollster:  ……………………………………………………………… 3 
 
Settlement: ……………………………………………………………… 4 
 
Code: ……………………………………………………………… 5 
Type of settlement: 
 
 
 
1 – Budapest 
2 – County center, city 
3 – other town 
4 – village 
6 
County:  
01 - Budapest 
02 - Baranya 
03 - Bács-Kiskun 
04 - Békés 
05 - Borsod -A.-Z. 
06 - Csongrád 
07 - Fejér 
08 - Győr-M.-S. 
09 - Hajdú-Bihar 
10 - Heves 
11 - J.-N.-Szolnok 
12 - Komárom-E. 
13 - Nógrád 
14 - Pest 
15 – Somogy 
16 - Szabolcs-Sz.-B. 
17 - Tolna 
18 - Vas 
19 – Veszprém 
20 - Zala 
7 
 
 
Please sign this statement! 
 
I declare, that I prepared the interview according to the regulations with the individuals chosen 
according to the rules of random sampling. I checked the coding and I kept all the rules and  
instructions! 
 
        Signature 
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B1. How much are you interested in....? 
 complet
ely 
to a 
certain 
extent 
not 
really 
not at all NT =0 
NV=X  
  
1. world politics 4 3 2 1 0   X  9
2. national politics 4 3 2 1 0   X  10
3. business news 4 3 2 1 0   X  11
4. information on defense 4 3 2 1 0   X  12
5. information on armed 
conflicts 
4 3 2 1 0   X  13
6. European Union 4 3 2 1 0   X  14
7. sport event 4 3 2 1 0   X  15
8. police news  4 3 2 1 0   X  16
 
BZ2. I will mention organizations, institutions. Please, tell me how much you trust them. You 
need to give a mark as in the school from 1 to 5. One means that you do not trust them at all, 
while 5 means that you trust them completely.  
How much do you trust… 
 
 complete
ly (5) 
(4) (3) (2) Not at all (1) NT  NV    
1. border guards 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  17
2. Hungarian Defense Forces 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  18
3. police 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  19
4. prosecutors 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  20
5. newspapers, Hungarian press 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  21
6. commercial radios 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  22
7. Hungarian Radio 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  23
8. commercial TVs  (TV2, RTL 
klub) 
5 4 3 2 1 0 X  24
9. Hungarian Television (MTV) 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  25
10.municipalities 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  26
11. Constitutional Court 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  27
12. churches 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  28
13. Hungarian government 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  29
14. Parliament 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  30
15. courts 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  31
16. trade unions 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  32
17. the president 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  33
18. associations, foundations 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  34
19. European Union 5 4 3 2 1 0 X  35
20.Ministry of Defense  5 4 3 2 1 0 X  36
 
H2. Do you agree or disagree with the decision that the Hungarian Defense Forces by the 
end of  2005 will exclusively consist of volunteers, i. e. contracted and professional soldiers. 
1 – agree 
2 – do not agree  
 6 8  
0 – do not know                                             X – no answer     
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GIVE THE INDIVIDUAL THE ANSWER SHEET 1. 
 
F2. Let’s suppose that you have to decide on the funds available for the development of the 
Hungarian Defense Forces. If you had 1000 forints, how much would you spend on the following 
purposes?
 The sum in forints 
 
9999 - NT 
XXXX - 
NV 
  
1. increase the salary of the soldiers   69
2. renovation of barracks   70
3. military cultural centers   71
4. increasing the number of contracted soldiers    72
5. procurement of up-to-date armaments    73
6. better military training  
 
 
9999 
 
XXXX 
 74
Total: 1000 Ft. 
 
N7. In your opinion, how important institution is the Hungarian Defense Forces? 
4 – very important 
3 – rather important 
2 – rather not important, or 
1 – not important at all
 111 
0 – do not know                       X – no answer     
N12. Would you support a government decision to spend more on the defense of the 
country?  
4 – completely                      3 – rather yes  
2 – rather not                        1 – not at all
 122 
0 – do not know                   X – no answer     
 
 
P5. Did you perform military service? 
1 – yes 
2 – yes, but as a conscientious objector 
3 – no
140 
4 – the question does not apply (e.g. women, disabled) 
X – no answer     
 
 
P6. In your opinion how true are the following statements for the Hungarian Defense Forces. 
 complete
ly 
 
rather 
true 
rather 
not  
not at all NT=0 
NV=X 
  
1. It is an important national institution 4 3 2 1 0    X  141
2. The population trust it  4 3 2 1 0    X  142
3. Its officers are well trained  4 3 2 1 0    X  143
4. The military barracks are out-of-date  4 3 2 1 0    X  144
5. The armament and the military technology is 
in need of significant development  
4 3 2 1 0    X  145
6. The military career is getting more and more 
acknowledged.  
4 3 2 1 0    X  146
7. It is able to defend the country 4 3 2 1 0    X  147
8. It is able to defend the country in cooperation 
with NATO defense forces 
4 3 2 1 0    X  148
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GIVE THE INDIVIDUAL THE ANSWER SHEET 3. 
M1. Mainly from which source of information do you learn about the Hungarian Defense 
Forces?  Please, choose 3 of the following sources of information which you use the most often. 
 
Now, please choose 3 from the rest of the sources, which you use the least often.  
 most often least often did not 
choose it 
NT = 0 
NV = X  
  
1. Newspapers 1 2 3 0    X  162 
2. Television 1 2 3 0    X  163 
3. Radio 1 2 3 0    X  164 
4. Internet 1 2 3 0    X  165 
5. Military publications 1 2 3 0    X  166 
6. Experience 1 2 3 0    X  167 
7. Experience through family members 1 2 3 0    X  168 
8. Through friends  1 2 3 0    X  169 
9. Rumors 1 2 3 0    X  170 
 
 
A0. Which is the closest circle in which we can find the following people? 
 close family relatives friends nowher
e 
NT=0 
NV=X 
  
1. conscript 4 3 2 1 0     X  191 
2. professional officer 4 3 2 1 0     X  192 
3. professional NCO 4 3 2 1 0     X  193 
4. contracted soldier 4 3 2 1 0     X  194 
5. policeman 4 3 2 1 0     X  195 
6. border guard 4 3 2 1 0     X  196 
 
QUESTIONS ON DEMOGRAPHY 
 
A1. Sex: 1 - Male       2 - Female  270 
A2. Age?                                                             
............................................. years271 
A3. Highest education:  
1 – less than elementary school         2 – elementary school 
3 – skilled worker,                             4 – grammar school 
5 – degree (undergraduate, graduate)        
X – no answer
 272 
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Annex 6: The influence of the source of information on 
public opinion 
 
Variable  Sum of Squares 
Degree of 
freedom 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
B1.4 Between groups 15,18 1 15,17824 20,61574 0,00
 Within groups 734,77 998 0,736245   
 Total 749,95 999    
BZ2.2 Between groups 15,02 1 15,0153 10,53876 0,00
 Within groups 1420,49 997 1,424769   
 Total 1435,51 998    
H2 Between groups 1,48 1 1,477868 4,664505 0,03
 Within groups 313,35 989 0,316833   
 Total 314,83 990    
F2.1 Between groups 1033,67 1 1033,671 0,042398 0,84
 Within groups 24112290,55 989 24380,48   
 Total 24113324,22 990    
F2.2 Between groups 10117,37 1 10117,37 0,509882 0,48
 Within groups 19624325,97 989 19842,59   
 Total 19634443,34 990    
F2.3 Between groups 2051,83 1 2051,828 0,395319 0,53
 Within groups 5091694,97 981 5190,311   
 Total 5093746,80 982    
F2.4 Between groups 31788,27 1 31788,27 1,703157 0,19
 Within groups 18216380,45 976 18664,32   
 Total 18248168,72 977    
F2.5 Between groups 23041,07 1 23041,07 1,135682 0,29
 Within groups 20024571,72 987 20288,32   
 Total 20047612,79 988    
F2.6 Between groups 51,17 1 51,16641 0,00216 0,96
 Within groups 23329481,36 985 23684,75   
 Total 23329532,52 986    
N7 Between groups 1,46 1 1,460986 2,272471 0,13
 Within groups 640,33 996 0,642906   
 Total 641,80 997    
N12 Between groups 6,74 1 6,740239 5,996969 0,01
 Within groups 1119,45 996 1,123941   
 Total 1126,19 997    
P6.1 Between groups 3,29 1 3,294974 5,043061 0,02
 Within groups 651,41 997 0,653368   
 Total 654,70 998    
P6.2 Between groups 0,94 1 0,941737 0,969887 0,32
 Within groups 969,03 998 0,970975   
 Total 969,98 999    
P6.3 Between groups 5,26 1 5,260286 4,527472 0,03
 Within groups 1159,54 998 1,161859   
 Total 1164,80 999    
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Variable  
Sum of 
Squares 
Degree of 
Freedom 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
P6.4 Between groups 0,94 1 0,939441 0,738189 0,39 
 Within groups 1270,08 998 1,27263   
 Total 1271,02 999    
P6.5 Between groups 5,33 1 5,331094 4,540284 0,03 
 Within groups 1171,83 998 1,174176   
 Total 1177,16 999    
P6.6 Between groups 2,52 1 2,518601 2,120148 0,15 
 Within groups 1185,56 998 1,187936   
 Total 1188,08 999    
P6.7 Between groups 0,34 1 0,34456 0,28511 0,59 
 Within groups 1206,10 998 1,208516   
 Total 1206,44 999    
P6.8 Between groups 1,44 1 1,436611 1,488747 0,22 
 Within groups 962,08 997 0,96498   
 Total 963,52 998    
 
Variable Source N Mean 
B1.4 Media 952 2,215336
 Experience 48 2,791667
 Total 1000 2,243
BZ2.2 Media 952 3,272059
 Experience 47 3,851064
 Total 999 3,299299
H2 Media 943 1,195122
 Experience 48 1,375
 Total 991 1,203835
F2.1 Media 943 177,5345
 Experience 48 182,2917
 Total 991 177,7649
F2.2 Media 943 173,6585
 Experience 48 188,5417
 Total 991 174,3794
F2.3 Media 936 70,03739
 Experience 47 76,80851
 Total 983 70,36114
F2.4 Media 931 117,0806
 Experience 47 90,42553
 Total 978 115,7996
F2.5 Media 941 167,2529
 Experience 48 144,7917
 Total 989 166,1628
F2.6 Media 940 173,1862
 Experience 47 174,2553
 Total 987 173,2371
N7 Media 950 3,133684
 Experience 48 3,3125
 Total 998 3,142285
Variable Source N Mean 
N12 Media 950 2,928421
 Experience 48 3,3125
 Total 998 2,946894
P6.1 Media 951 3,356467
 Experience 48 3,625
 Total 999 3,369369
P6.2 Media 952 2,898109
 Experience 48 3,041667
 Total 1000 2,905
P6.3 Media 952 2,785714
 Experience 48 3,125
 Total 1000 2,802
P6.4 Media 952 3,169118
 Experience 48 3,3125
 Total 1000 3,176
P6.5 Media 952 3,262605
 Experience 48 3,604167
 Total 1000 3,279
P6.6 Media 952 2,577731
 Experience 48 2,8125
 Total 1000 2,589
P6.7 Media 952 2,329832
 Experience 48 2,416667
 Total 1000 2,334
P6.8 Media 951 3,197687
 Experience 48 3,375
 Total 999 3,206206
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